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INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
THE ESSENCE OF DUTY 
ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN∗ 
“[Did you consider] yourself to have a duty to  
act in the best interests of your clients?” 
“I believe we have a duty to serve our clients well.” 
—Exchange between Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) and Daniel 
Sparks, Head of Goldman Sachs’ Mortgage Department1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The political theater surrounding the recently settled enforcement 
action against Goldman Sachs & Co.2 has punctuated the ongoing 
debate about the legal and professional obligations of financial in-
termediaries when recommending transactions in financial prod-
ucts—specifically, investment products that shift the risks and split 
the return of an underlying asset across the marketplace.3  Recent 
crises involving investors in auction-rate municipal securities4 and 
                                                          
 2. On July 15, 2010, Goldman, Sachs & Co. agreed to pay the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) a $550 million penalty, the largest ever paid by a Wall 
Street firm, to settle charges that it misled investors as to the process by which a ref-
erence portfolio of subprime residential mortgage backed securities was selected in 
marketing a synthetic collateralized debt obligation.  Notably, Goldman Sachs ac-
knowledged in its settlement papers that “the marketing materials for the ABACUS 
2007-AC1 transaction contained incomplete information” and agreed to undertake 
remedial action to prevent future violations, including a “comprehensive, firm-wide 
review of its business standards.” Litigation Release No. 21592, SEC, Goldman Sachs 
to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage 
CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2010/lr21592.htm [hereinafter Goldman Litigation Release]. 
 3. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (defining an “investment trans-
action” for these purposes).  For purposes of this article, transactions designed to 
achieve particular tax objectives or seek preferential classification for regulatory pur-
poses are not “investment transactions.”  Cf. Interagency Statement of Sounds Prac-
tices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured Finance Activities, Exchange Act 
Release No. 53773, 71 Fed. Reg. 28326, 28332–34 (May 16, 2006) (identifying and 
reviewing elevated risk complex structured financial transactions). 
 4. On May 31, 2006, fifteen broker-dealer firms consented to the entry of a 
cease-and-desist order and agreed to pay more than $13 million in penalties in con-
nection with alleged violations of federal securities law resulting from the marketing 
of “auction-rate securities” (i.e., municipal bonds, corporate bonds, and preferred 
stocks with variable interest rates or dividends periodically set by auction).  The SEC 
alleged that the firms had failed to adequately disclose certain practices to investors 
in connection with the conduct of the required auctions, the effect of which was to 
conceal the liquidity and credit risks of such securities and to favor certain customers 
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mortgage-backed securities5 have further demonstrated the destabiliz-
ing effects that poorly designed or unsuitable investment transactions 
can have on the financial markets as a whole.  Congress has recently 
taken a number of steps to address this crisis of confidence in invest-
ment recommendations and the quality of regulation in the financial 
services sector generally in the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.6   
Unlike other areas of financial regulation, such as financial respon-
sibility, where Congress sought more aggressively to harmonize regu-
latory treatment across financial services providers,7 the legislative re-
forms respecting investment recommendations continue to cling to 
the historic distinctions among “securities,” “derivatives,” “consumer 
finance,” and “banking” products.  For example, Congress has 
granted the SEC authority to promulgate rules imposing a uniform,8 
fiduciary9 standard of conduct on broker-dealers and investment ad-
visers when “providing personalized investment advice and recom-
mendations about securities to retail customers.”10  In the realm of 
over-the-counter derivatives, by contrast, the SEC and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) may only require swap deal-
                                                          
and issuers at the expense of others.  Bear, Stearns & Co., Securities Act Release  
No. 8684, 88 SEC Docket 259, 261–63 (May 31, 2006). 
 5. A confluence of factors has been identified as contributing to the ongoing 
foreclosure crisis in the U.S. housing market, including the demand for high-yield 
mortgage-backed securities, the profitability of securitization, the laxity of underwrit-
ing practices in subprime and Alt-A mortgage lending, and the development and 
marketing of exotic mortgage products with latent risks (e.g., adjustable rates, nega-
tive amortization). See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, 40 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 111-94,  
50–52 (2009) (summarizing relevant hearings). 
 6. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 7. See, e.g., S. Rep. 111-176 at 1348–50 (discussing the Act’s consolidation of or-
derly liquidation authority over both bank and nonbank financial companies).  
 8. Id. § 913(g)(1), at 1828 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1)) (providing 
that the SEC may promulgate rules to provide that the standard of conduct for a 
broker-dealer that provides personalized investment advice about securities to a retail 
customer “shall be the same as the standard of conduct applicable to an investment 
adviser”). Section 913(g)(1) specifically extends this authority to “such other cus-
tomers as the Commission may by rule provide.” 
 9. Id. § 913(g)(2), at 1828 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11) (authorizing 
the SEC to promulgate rules providing that “the standard of conduct for all brokers, 
dealers, and investment advisers, when providing personalized investment advice 
about securities to retail customers . . . shall be to act in the best interest of the cus-
tomer without regard to the financial or other interest”).  Section 913(g)(2) specifi-
cally extends this authority to “such other customers as the Commission may by rule 
provide.”  Id.  Congress has also required the SEC to harmonize enforcement of vi-
olations of that standard of conduct under the Exchange Act and the Investment Ad-
visers Act.  Id. § 913(h), at 1829 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(m), 80b-11(i).  
 10. For this purpose, the Act defines a “retail customer” to mean “natural per-
son” or legal representative thereof who “receives personalized investment advice 
about securities from a broker or dealer or investment adviser” and “uses such advice 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. § 913(a), at 1824 (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
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ers to provide certain material disclosures to their institutional “coun-
terparties” and to “communicate in a fair and balanced manner 
based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.”11 
Consider further the regime governing investment recommenda-
tions with respect to traditional banking products.  In the realm of 
consumer finance, the Act consolidates rulemaking authority over 
consumer financial products and services,12 including mortgages, in a 
new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.13  While the scope of 
the Bureau’s supervisory activities is broad,14 the Bureau’s authority is 
subject to oversight by other financial regulators15 and largely circum-
scribed to compelling disclosure of the risks and benefits of consum-
                                                          
 11. Id. § 731, at 1708 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s) (authorizing CFTC to adopt 
rules for swap dealers to ensure counterparties comply with eligibility standards, to 
disclose material risks and material conflicts of interests, and to provide daily marks 
on request); Id. § 764, at 1790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8) (establishing the 
same authority for the SEC). 
 12. The Act defines a covered “financial product or service” to include, among 
other financial activities:  extending credit and servicing loans; extending or broker-
ing leases functionally equivalent to purchase finance arrangements; engaging in de-
posit-taking activities; and providing financial advisory services to consumers on indi-
vidual financial matters or in relation to proprietary financial products or services.  
Id. § 1002(15)(A)(i)–(ii), (iv), (viii), at 1957–59 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481). 
 13. See id. tit. X, at 1955 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); id.  
§ 1101(a), at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5491) (establishing “in the Federal 
Reserve System[] an independent bureau” to “regulate the offering and provision of 
consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws”). 
 14. Id. § 1022, at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512) (authority to promul-
gate regulations and issue orders and interpretive guidance). The Act provides for 
the transfer of the consumer financial protection functions of the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to the new Bureau, as well as cer-
tain functions of the Federal Trade Commission under “enumerated consumer laws.”  
Id. § 1061, at 2037 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5581).  The Bureau also has the au-
thority to impose registration requirements on persons not otherwise subject to pru-
dential regulation, and to supervise nondepository institutions that originate, broker, 
or service certain consumer loans.  Id. § 1024(b)(1), at 1987 (to be codified at  
12 U.S.C. § 5514) (authorizing the Bureau to require reports and conduct examina-
tions on enumerated nondepository covered persons defined by the Bureau to assess 
compliance, obtain information about activities and compliance systems and proce-
dures, and to detect and assess risks to consumers and markets). 
 15. The autonomy of the Bureau was hotly contested in the negotiations over the 
final bill;  although the Dodd-Frank Act does not create the Bureau as a separate 
agency, as set forth in H.R. 4173, which passed in the House of Representatives, the 
ability of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to review or inter-
vene in any matters before the Bureau is limited. Id. § 1012(c), at 1965 (to be codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 5492) (describing autonomy of the Bureau).  However, the Finan-
cial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), on which the Federal Reserve Board has one 
seat, has the power to review and set aside final regulations of the Bureau if they 
would put “the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the sta-
bility of the financial system of the United States at risk.” Id. § 1023(a), at 1985 (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C § 5513).  
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er financial products and services16 and taking enforcement action to 
prevent “unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices,” as narrowly 
defined in the statute.17  At the same time, in light of abuses in the 
origination of residential mortgages, the Act imposes a nebulous “du-
ty or care”18 on loan originators requiring them, subject to certain 
safe harbors, to make a reasonable and good faith determination that 
the consumer is reasonably able to repay the loan.19  
As these open-ended and disjointed initiatives suggest, delimiting 
the legal and professional duty of the various categories of financial 
intermediaries in providing advice with respect to investment transac-
tions is a topic that policymakers have both exhaustively debated and 
yet unsatisfactorily addressed.20  On the one hand, financial interme-
diaries cannot perform the essential risk-spreading function of mar-
kets if investors can effectively exercise an option to “put” back the 
                                                          
 16. Id. § 1032, at 2006–07 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5532)  (authorizing the 
Bureau to prescribe rules and model disclosures to ensure that the features of any 
consumer financial product or service are “fully, accurately and effectively disclosed . 
. . in a manner that permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks”). 
 17. Id. § 1031(a), at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).  The Act also au-
thorizes the Bureau to prescribe rules that identify “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts 
or practices” in connection with transactions for or the offering of consumer finan-
cial protects or services as unlawful, as well as to adopt prophylactic rules to prevent 
such acts or practices.  Id. § 1031(b), at 2005–06 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).  
To declare an act or practice “unfair,” the Bureau must have a “reasonable basis” for 
concluding that it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is 
not reasonably avoidable” or “outweighed countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”  Id. § 1031(c), at 2006 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).  To declare 
an act or practice “abusive,” the Act requires the Bureau to find that a practice “ma-
terially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition” 
or takes unreasonable advantage” of a consumer’s lack of understanding, inability to 
protect self-interest, or reasonable reliance.  Id. § 1031(d), at 2006 (to be codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 5531).  
 18. Id. § 1402, at 2139 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b). 
 19. Id. § 1411, at 2142 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c) (requiring creditors, 
prior to making a residential mortgage loan, to make a reasonable and good faith 
determination based on verified and documented information about income and 
assets that a consumer is reasonably able to repay the loan and all applicable taxes, 
insurance, and assessments).  The Act also creates a safe harbor for “qualified mort-
gages,” see id. § 1412 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c); infra text accompanying notes 
266–268, and prohibits mortgage originators from steering customers away from 
“qualified mortgages,” or steering customers to mortgage loans that cannot reasona-
bly be paid or that have predatory characteristics or effects.  Id. § 1403 (codified at  
15 U.S.C. § 1639b); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(e).  
 20. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701 (2010) (discussing the historically different ways in 
which fiduciary duties have or have not been imposed on broker-dealers and invest-
ment advisers and the need for reform); Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 
71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 451–52 (2010) (exploring the difficulty of defining the scope 
of reform if the SEC seeks convergence of the fiduciary duties of broker-dealers and 
investment advisers); Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets:  Applying 
Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 837–38 (2009). 
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risk of investment products through the threat of litigation.21  On the 
other hand, as financial innovation increases in complexity and inves-
tors take on greater responsibility for their financial security, the pro-
fession, if not the law, must intervene to ensure that the end-users of 
such products are not disadvantaged by the imbalance in information 
and sophistication between financial services providers and their cus-
tomers.22 
Commentators have long catalogued the traditional templates with-
in which the obligations of financial services providers may be 
judged.23  As discussed in much greater detail below, fiduciary rela-
tionships between financial services providers and clients who repose 
their trust and confidence in them create sweeping duties of loyalty 
and care enforceable in law and equity.  Professional obligations  
defined and enforced by industry representatives, such as the obliga-
tion to ensure that products and transactions are “suitable” or “ap-
propriate” for a client based on its individual needs, may provide col-
lateral benefits for such clients through public enforcement and in 
some cases private litigation or arbitration.  Likewise, tailored disclo-
sures and prohibitions against fraudulent, unfair, or deceptive prac-
tices may provide investors with additional grounds for relief beyond 
those available in the common law of contract or tort.  As adaptable 
as these concepts are, courts continue to grapple with their applica-
tion to discrete disputes, while regulators take conflicting positions as 
to which template best fits certain products or categories of financial  
intermediary.  
What is remarkable about the Act’s various mandates, however, is 
the subtle attempt to conform the standards that traditional securities 
brokers and dealers, security and non-security based swap dealers, 
mortgage originators, and other financial services providers must ob-
serve when recommending or structuring transactions for retail cus-
tomers.  Whether such a convergence will actually occur depends in 
large part on how such standards are characterized.  For example, 
                                                          
 21. See, e.g., Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers:   
The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 464 (caricaturing the “greedy old lady” 
posing as the “sweet trusting widow” in order to rescind a transaction with her “faith-
less (wealthy) broker”).  
 22. James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now:  The Importance, Nature, Provision and 
Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 112 (1998) (understand-
ing retirement planning); Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor—
Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345, 365 (1995). 
 23. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention:  Wholesale Derivatives, Retail 
Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2332 (1996) (laying out 
the “core substantive aspects” of “efforts to ‘improve’ sales practices” developed by 
commentators).  
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while the SEC staff has echoed24 the recommendation of those com-
mentators who have argued that a fiduciary duty should govern in-
vestment advice given by brokers and dealers (as it governs invest-
ment advisers today),25 the staff has provided little guidance as to 
what concrete steps may be taken to harmonize sales practices with-
out requiring broker-dealers to make significant changes to their  
operations.26  Moreover, the CFTC and bank regulators would likely 
object to any such fiduciary standard that applied to over-the-counter 
derivatives, mortgages, and other financial products that have tradi-
tionally been viewed as arm’s-length agreements.27  
Because a uniform standard of sales practices across all financial 
services would improve investor understanding and facilitate investor 
decision-making, this Article advocates that securities regulators  
eschew attempts to establish a chimerical fiduciary duty that would 
apply only to broker-dealers and investment advisers, and instead opt 
to work with the CFTC, bank regulators, and other federal and state 
financial regulators to adopt a uniform approach to defining the  
obligations of financial services providers when making investment 
recommendations.  The CFTC and bank regulators, in response, 
should heed the admonitions of the Dodd-Frank Act and work with 
the SEC to develop standards that capture the essence of the fidu-
ciary obligation, even as they might rightly continue to object to the 
liability of banks and other credit market participants as fiduciaries.  
What form would such a standard take?  This Article presumes that 
the essence of a financial services provider’s duty—regardless of how 
                                                          
 24. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS 107–111 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011 
/913studyfinal.pdf (presenting findings on standards of conduct for investment ad-
visers and broker-dealers as required by section 913(b)–(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act) 
[hereinafter SEC REPORT]. 
 25. See, e.g., Matthew P. Allen, A Lesson From History, Roosevelt to Obama— 
The Evolution of Broker-Dealer Regulation:  From Self-Regulation, Arbitration, and Suitability 
to Federal Regulation, Litigation, and Fiduciary Duty, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1 
(2010) (outlining regulation of broker-dealers from before to after Dodd-Frank); 
Ronald J. Columbo, Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 829, 
864 (2010) (suggesting Dodd-Frank did not go far enough because it only required a 
study to determine the need for fiduciary duty); Laby, supra note 20, at 703–04 (ar-
guing for uniform fiduciary standard because financial advice is no longer incidental 
to the brokerage industry, but an integral part of industry practice); Cody Vitello,  
The Wall Street Reform Act Of 2010 and What It Means for Joe & Jane Consumer, 23 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 99 (2010) (urging reform under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 26. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 111. 
 27. Eric C. Seitz, U.S. Subprime Crisis:  H.R. 3915—A Far-Sighted Solution to the Mort-
gage Crisis, 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 759, 771–74 (2008) (arguing the suitability doctrine 
goes too far); Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending Industry:  An Industry in  
Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J. 407, 414 (2007) (same); Susan Wachter, Price Revelation and 
Efficient Mortgage Markets, 82 TEX. L. REV. 413, 414–16 (2003) (finding a suitability 
standard would cause instability in credit markets). 
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it is constituted or regulated—is to have an ongoing, honest discus-
sion with the customer about each investment decision.  More specif-
ically, a discussion focused on a specific measure of risk—for exam-
ple, the financial services provider’s own estimate of the cost of 
hedging the transaction at certain intervals—will focus the customer’s 
attention to the risk of the proposed transaction and comparable 
transaction with a view to prompting a broader discussion of the cus-
tomer’s financial goals and needs.  Customers must be allowed to 
take (and financial services providers must be allowed to recom-
mend) financial risks, but only if the customer receives complete, 
adequate, and comprehensible information from the financial servic-
es provider about its assessment of the risks and rewards of a transac-
tion.  If financial intermediaries are to be permitted (or required) to 
act as principals in investment transactions, of course, full disclosure 
of their proprietary holdings, trading, and valuation models is not 
realistic; financial intermediaries can nevertheless structure a dialo-
gue about investment decisions with their clients in a manner that 
promotes the communication of relevant information to the custom-
er and thereby enables the intermediary to discharge its obligations.  
Part I of this Article considers the basic policy rationales that un-
derlie the development of sales practice or business conduct rules for 
recommending investment transactions.  Part II considers existing le-
gal approaches to regulating such recommendations under securities, 
commodities, banking, and insurance law.  Part III summarizes the 
difficulties in extending a fiduciary standard to the various kinds of 
financial products marketed today.  Part IV surveys various proposals 
to improve the process by which financial intermediaries make in-
vestment recommendations, and Part V offers a proposal for a uni-
form sales practice rule for financial services providers when recom-
mending such transactions. 
I. WHY WE REGULATE INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policymakers tend to treat investment transactions differently from 
commercial transactions (where communications with counterparties 
are governed by principles of common law contract and tort) and 
consumer transactions (where communications with consumers are 
subject to prohibitions against “unfair and deceptive acts or practic-
es”).28  Commentators both for and against greater regulation in this 
                                                          
 28. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION:  
FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 
79–81 (2004); Hu, supra note 23, at 2343. 
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area have struggled to identify whether the solicitation of investment 
transactions is affected with such imbalances in information, sophisti-
cation, and ability to absorb risk, or is rife with conflicts of interest so 
prevalent and pervasive, that they should be governed by a unique set 
of rules and standards instead of the morals of the marketplace.29 
For purposes of this discussion, the scope of the term “investment 
transactions” or “investment recommendations” is intended to in-
clude not only transactions involving traditional investment products, 
such as stocks, bonds, shares in mutual and exchange-traded funds, 
and structured notes, but also transactions involving mortgaged 
property, derivatives, and other products that entail capital at risk 
and an expectation of profit, whether marketed by banks, insurance 
companies, or other financial services providers.30  It is also important 
to stress the difference between investment products and investment 
transactions:  An otherwise suitable product may be sold in an unsuit-
able transaction (for example, if the markup or commission is exces-
sive or the terms of financing are unconscionable).31  The manner in 
which a transaction is designed, moreover, may significantly affect a 
customer’s decision to invest in a given product.32  
                                                          
 29. But see Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation:  Regulating Credit Markets  
Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 193 (2009) (suggesting that market pressure result-
ing from the rescission of or default on mortgages held by special purpose vehicles 
may improve underwriting standards for mortgages and hence improve customer 
protection). 
 30. Some commentators correctly note that hedging transactions should not be 
deemed investments per se, as they are predominantly used to eliminate or reduce 
the risk of fluctuation in interest rates, currency exchange rates, or market prices in 
connection with routine operating transactions.  George J. Sotos & Kevin F. Bowen, 
Commodities Regulation—The Proposed Suitability Standards for the Commodity Industry:  
Right Church, Wrong Pew, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289, 303 (1976) (arguing that hedging 
is not investing).  To the extent that derivatives trading is dominated by contracts on 
individual securities or financial indices, which are combined with securities and 
other instruments to adjusted portfolios or to create synthetic investment (such as in 
various exchange traded funds, collateralized debt obligations, and structured finan-
cial products), there is a strong case for subjecting them to the same regulatory  
regime as other investment products.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR 
A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 106–109 (2008), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf (de-
scribing the rise of financial futures and the corresponding need for convergence 
between securities and futures regulation) [hereinafter “TREASURY BLUEPRINT”]. 
 31. Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 
1277 (1995); Mundheim, supra note 21, at 448–54. See generally Norman S. Poser,  
Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001 
BYU L. REV. 1493, 1527–69. 
 32. See, e.g., Goldman Litigation Release, supra note 2 (suggesting that the failure 
to disclose the passive nature of the collateral manager’s role in selecting securities 
for a synthetic CDO was a material misstatement). 
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A. Limiting Assumption of Risk 
To the extent that investment transactions are about shifting risk to 
the investor, whether from the intermediary, an issuer, or a third par-
ty, the mere risk that a customer may lose all or part of its investment 
cannot, in and of itself, be sufficient justification for imposing liability 
on a financial intermediary.33  Sales practice rules, for example, 
should not generally be thought of as an “insurance policy” against 
unfulfilled customer expectations, absent some additional policy jus-
tification for imposing liability on the firm.34  Nevertheless, some 
commentators have postulated that there should be substantive limits 
on the amount of risk firms should allow their customers to bear even 
in unsolicited transactions, on the theory that firms have a duty to 
prevent customers from “gambling”35 or committing “economic sui-
cide.”36  The suggestion appears to be that some level of risk is subs-
tantively so untenable, based on the type of investment or the size of 
the transaction, that firms have a duty to intervene.37 
Certainly, in transactions where the investor is required to make a 
stream of payments over a period of time,38 there is a strong legal and 
reputational interest in limiting the customer’s exposure to risk.  
Firms that extend credit to customers as principals, whether in the 
context of financing transactions or derivative transactions, have an 
interest in ensuring that the customer is able to satisfy any obligations 
it undertakes.  For example, the NYSE’s “know-your-customer” rule, 
the precursor to the suitability doctrine, reflected the exchange’s 
concern about protecting firms against customers’ fraudulent conduct 
or inability to perform.39  Likewise, the Office of the Comptroller of 
                                                          
 33. Hu, supra note 23, at 2357; Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit 
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 59–62 (2008). 
 34. Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972) 
(warning against allowing a civil penalty to amount to an “insurance policy”). 
 35. See generally Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, With a Tulip, in the South Seas:  
Gambling and the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225 (2001); 
Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?  Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securi-
ties Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995).  
 36. Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (noting that brokers have no continuing duty to keep investors 
informed of developments which could affect the value of their portfolios) aff’d, 647 
F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); Powers, 344 F. Supp. at 433.  
 37. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide:  The Collision of Ethics and Risk in 
Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 499 (2003) (arguing for securities brokers’ duty 
to review, monitor, stop trading). 
 38. Such payments could take a variety of forms:  mortgage payments, interest 
payments on margin loans, net payments under swap agreements, variation margin 
for options, futures, and other derivatives cleared through a clearinghouse. 
 39. Sotos & Bowen, supra note 30, at 301. 
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the Currency’s (OCC) “appropriateness” doctrine for national banks 
entering into derivatives reflected the OCC’s concern that firms 
might suffer credit or reputational risk if counterparties were unable 
to make the required payments.40 
On a macroeconomic level, an argument could be made that the 
law should impose some limits on the assumption of risk in invest-
ment transactions because the financial system is unable to bear the 
shock of mass defaults and ensuing litigation.41  Commentators have 
noted the externalities wrought by the recent financial boom and 
bust:  blight from foreclosures resulting from predatory lending,42 dis-
tortions in market demand for credit,43 and a disproportionate im-
pact on poor minorities without history of access to credit markets.44  
To the extent, moreover, that there are proposals to replace public 
funding of retirement and health care programs with self-directed 
private accounts, such proposals must take into account the strain 
placed on welfare programs by widespread declines in the value of re-
tirees’ investments.45  On the other hand, sales practice rules may not 
be the most appropriate vehicle for deterring such losses, to the ex-
tent that that financial services providers are likely to be under equal 
stress during such periods and may not be able to absorb the shock of 
such events without government assistance. 
B. Least Cost Avoidance 
A second set of policy justifications for imposing sales practice rules 
on financial intermediaries is based on the proposition that financial 
                                                          
 40. Jason M. Rosenthal, Incorporation May Not Mean Sophistication:  Should There Be 
a Suitability Requirement for Banks Selling Derivatives to Corporations?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1249, 1259 (1996). 
 41. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. MDL-1446, 
2011 WL 43421, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2011) (dismissing allegations of materially 
misleading statements with regards to assets deposited into a special purpose entity 
and offered to investors); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 08 
Civ. 10841, 2010 WL 4903619, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2010) (discussing whether 
plaintiffs’ claims of untrue statements of materials facts with regard to loans depo-
sited into a special purpose entity were properly dismissed). 
 42. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:  The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002). 
 43. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 63–64. 
 44. Id. at 64–69; Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans:  The Value of a Mass Torts  
Approach in Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 29–36 & n.105 (2009) 
(suggesting a “growing awareness that a disproportionate share of subprime loans, 
particularly those in the latter years of the subprime mortgage market’s heyday, were 
marketed and sold to African-American and Latino borrowers” and summarizing 
cases alleging that lenders violated civil rights laws by steering minorities into sub-
prime and predatory loans).  
 45. Fanto, supra note 22, at 112 (understanding retirement planning); Karmel, 
supra note 31, at 909; Markham, supra note 22, at 365. 
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services providers have better information, or at least better access to 
information, necessary to make informed investment decisions and, 
thus, are better able to avoid the foreseeable losses resulting from in-
vestment transactions.46  For example, commentators have argued 
that securities and other financial products are “credence” goods,47 
the value of which often turns largely on information available to is-
suers or sponsors—such as the quality of management, estimates of 
future earnings, or the value of underlying assets.  To the extent that 
investors are unable to discount for such asymmetry,48 firms should, at 
a minimum, be obligated to provide information in the first instance.  
Moreover, to the extent that all financial innovation carries latent 
risks, it may be reasonable to hold firms responsible for such risks as 
an incentive for them to perform ongoing diligence.49  
Asymmetries in access to information between intermediaries and 
their clients, of course, vary from transaction to transaction.  For 
some transactions, such as derivatives or stock funds indexed to cur-
rencies, spot prices in commodity markets, or broad-based indices, it 
is arguable that firms possess no privileged access to information.50  
Moreover, government agencies, financial firms and sophisticated in-
vestors devote extensive resources to basic research on property pric-
                                                          
 46. Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1335 (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of So-
cial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). 
 47. Arthur R. Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for the 
Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 82–88 & n.22 (1989) (summarizing the view of 
economists that a “security’s value depends upon information, much of which is 
about the business and comes directly from the business” and therefore that “the 
value of securities is substantially dependent upon the ability of the business issuing 
the securities to supply the firm-specific information to the buyers”). 
 48. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 49. Jennifer Bethel & Allen Ferrel, Policy Issues Raised by Structured Products, in 
NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS:  OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY 
CHALLENGES 167, 173–74 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (noting the 
recent rise in sales of structured products to retail investors, and the current regime 
in place to protect such investors); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a 
Blind Eye:  Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2039 n.1 
(2007).  
 50. See, e.g., LAWRENCE HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 314–315 (2003) (observ-
ing that, to the extent informational asymmetries contribute to wider spreads, 
“[s]preads in contracts that represent economywide risks” will be “quite small” be-
cause “[t]raders rarely have significant material information” about such conditions 
and “information about local supply and demand conditions” generally does not 
have a “material effect” on the whole market; making similar observations about “di-
versified portfolios” to the extent that “information about individual assets” “rarely is 
material” to all assets in the portfolio); see also Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, 337 F. Supp. 107, 112 (D.C. Ala. 1971) (noting that a “broker has 
no duty to relay news of political, economic, weather or price changes to his  
principal”) 
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es, default and prepayment rates on mortgages, economic forecast-
ing, agricultural cycles, and so forth with a view to divining how such 
transactions will perform.51  In other cases, markets operate without 
an adequate opportunity for investors to perform diligence, and in 
effect, force reliance on the firm’s integrity in finding or structuring 
the investment transaction.52   
When the variables contributing to the value of an investment 
transaction are within the intermediary’s control or at least subject to 
its influence, the case for holding intermediaries liable may be 
stronger.  For example, in some transactions, the firm retains the 
right to amend the terms of the transaction unilaterally (e.g., the 
right to call or increase the interest rate on margin loans), or assumes 
responsibility for the determination of critical obligations under the 
transaction (e.g., collateral payments based on the fair value of the 
transaction).53  In others, the transaction may be effected in reliance 
on continued willingness of the firm, the issuer, or the sponsor to 
maintain a secondary market in the investment product54 or, in the 
absence of a secondary market, to provide an opportunity to unwind 
the transaction on reasonable terms.55  While sales practice rules typi-
cally look to the firm’s conduct at the time of the transaction,56 one 
can question whether heightened duties at the outset are an appro-
priate way to encourage both full disclosure and faithful conduct 
throughout the life of the investment. 
                                                          
 51. HARRIS, supra note 50, at 314 (noting that “many governments have agencies 
that collect and publish information on market conditions” in order “[t]o reduce 
information asymmetries”); DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT 
BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY:  THE NEW PARADIGM 119–122 (2010) (not-
ing that the research provided by large investment banks “usually covers equity, fixed 
income, currency, and commodity markets”).  
 52. Engel & McCoy, supra note 49, at 2060, 2068 (noting that institutional inves-
tors often lack the opportunity to perform adequate due diligence with subprime 
mortgage pools and instead rely on credit entities whose interests are not aligned). 
 53. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 9 (discussing credit card interest-
rate adjustments). 
 54. See, e.g., Bear, Stearns & Co., Securities Act Release No. 8684, 88 SEC Docket 
259, 260 & n.3 (May 31, 2006) (noting Bear Stearns’ facilitation of a secondary mar-
ket in auction-rate securities in which customers could make transactions based on 
the underlying par value).  
 55. Bethel & Ferrel, supra note 49, at 22. 
 56. Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties:  Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deter-
rent for Willful Violations?:  Hearing on S. 3217 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of 
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (Testimony of John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) [hereinafter 
Coffee Testimony].  
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C. Imbalances in Actual or Perceived Sophistication 
Another common policy justification for enhanced sales practice 
rules for investment transactions is the imbalance in sophistication 
between financial firms and their customers, whether real or per-
ceived.  The expansion of homeownership, defined contribution 
plans, and individual retirement planning means that more house-
holds engage in investment transactions, but basic financial literacy, 
in the view of some commentators, has not kept up with these 
trends.57  Similarly, even relatively sophisticated institutional investors 
or corporations58 may not rationally be able to devote sufficient re-
sources to mastering the terms of financial transactions designed by 
specialized teams within major commercial or investment banks.59  As 
a result, policymakers debate whether regulation should paternalisti-
cally correct for such imbalances by shifting some of the responsibili-
ty for decision-making to financial intermediaries, or whether regula-
tors should focus on warning investors of risks and prompting them 
to educate themselves.60  
                                                          
 57. See, e.g., Allison De Tal, Knowledge Is Power:  Consumer Education and the Sub-
prime Mortgage Market, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 633, 651 (2008) (noting the lack of financial 
literacy leading to the subprime mortgage problems and arguing for a financial 
counseling requirement for purchases of mortgages with certain characteristics); 
Fanto, supra note 22, at 107–08 (“Saving and investing are critical for survival in our 
society . . . . Because investing has assumed a significance in their lives that it did not 
generally have for their parents, they must be educated in how to invest.”); Henry T. 
C. Hu, The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and the Public Corporation 
Model, 60 BUS. LAW. 1303, 1307–08 (2005) (“The inevitable long-run cutbacks in So-
cial Security and Medicare benefits further emphasize the need for all Americans to 
have some at least minimally acceptable framework for evaluating investment risks 
and returns.”); see also Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 197, 200 (2008) (arguing that widespread investor education is not plausible). 
 58. Professor Choi, among others, has advocated a certification regime, in which 
investors would hold themselves out as possessing (or be evaluated to determine 
whether they possess) the sophistication necessary to participate in investment trans-
actions; concomitantly, firms would be relieved of ethical obligations (but presuma-
bly not liability for affirmative misstatements) to such customers.  Stephen J. Choi, 
Regulating Investors Not Issuers:  A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 280 
(2000). This philosophy is recognized, to a certain degree, in the CFTC’s disclosure-
based approach to suitability and the NASD’s interpretive memorandum regarding 
suitability obligations to institutional investors.  See infra note 156.  
 59. Hu, supra note 23, at 2356; Poser, supra note 31, at 1517–19; Rosenthal, supra 
note 30, at 1255 (firms may have pricing models superior to those of the corporate 
end-users).  Moreover, to the extent that institutional investors necessarily act 
through human agents, commentators have also noted that such human agents are 
often prone to the same cognitive biases as investors acting for their own account.  
See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation?  Some Behavioral Observations Re-
garding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1511 (2002) (collecting evidence 
that contends market professionals are subject to the same biases as other investors). 
 60. Black & Gross, supra note 37, at 483–85; Fanto, supra note 22, at 118–26  
(arguing that “[c]onstraints in American culture,” such as the “preference for indi-
vidual responsibility and decision-making” and the “longstanding ‘Main Street’ hos-
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In recent years, scholars following the field of behavioral econom-
ics have argued that sales practice regulation should also take into ac-
count the cognitive biases that impair rational decision making.61  
Even investors with a working knowledge of financial concepts ex-
pected of the “reasonable investor”—such as the time value of money, 
the relationship between risk and return,62 or simple financial 
fraud63—may be susceptible to sales pitches that exploit basic cogni-
tive limitations or psychological vulnerabilities.64  Some scholars have 
suggested that firms use detailed information about how consumers’ 
expected use of financial products deviates from their actual use 
                                                          
tility to, suspicion of, and yet irresistible attraction to the dominant market capitalism 
typified by Wall Street,” compel an approach in which individuals take responsibility 
for their own savings and investment decisions but demand education to help “cor-
rect the ‘educational’ asymmetry between ordinary investors and Wall Street”),; Fre-
derick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended Securities:  An 
Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535, 586 (2005); David Reiss, 
Subprime Standardization:  How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending To Flourish in the 
Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1004 (2006).  
 61. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk:  Some Lessons for Law From  
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 
635 (1996); Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation:  A Be-
havioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 358–78 (analyzing behavioral factors such 
as rational ignorance, optimism, biases, and probabilities). 
 62. Fanto, supra note 22, at 132 (“A consumer must comprehend elementary 
finance to be able to think about investing from a financial perspective. An investor 
should understand the time value of money, investment return and risks, liquidity, 
and the relationship of risk to return”); Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as 
They Go Along:  The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1037 
(2002) (observing that courts expect reasonable investors appreciate to the time val-
ue of money, the relationship of return to risk, how brokers are compensated, and 
the importance of diversification).  
 63. Fanto, supra note 22, at 135 (suggesting that investors “should learn the basic 
features and rationale of the kinds of investment fraud that they are most likely to 
encounter”); See also Jayne W. Barnard, Deception, Decisions, and Investor Education, 17 
ELDER L.J. 201, 226–35 (2009) (addressing the use of investor education to combat 
deceptive investment practices); Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change:  The 
Case for Replacing “the Reasonable Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in  
Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 476–480, 486 (2006) (observing that the “rea-
sonable investor” standard for assessing materiality assumes the ability to see through 
simple frauds—”schemes promising, for example, a forty-four percent return in 
twelve days or a $500,000 return from a $3000 investment”—which unsophisticated 
investors trading in an inefficient market without the benefit of an adviser [“under-
class investors”] may lack). 
 64. See Langevoort, supra note 61, at 635; Prentice, supra note 61, at 358–78.  Af-
finity fraud—which the SEC defines as “scams that prey upon members of identifia-
ble groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly, or professional 
groups—poses such risks even for the most successful investors.  See U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Comm’n, Affinity Fraud:  How to Avoid Investment Scams that Target 
Groups, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/affinity.htm (last updated Sept. 6, 2006); 
see also Douglas M. Branson, Trekking Toward Über Regulation:  Prospects for Meaningful 
Change at SEC Enforcement?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 545, 563 & n. 78 (2010); Heather Hiz-
nay, How the Bernard Madoff Scandal Exposed Weakness in Asset Management Regulation, 
28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 413, 414 (2009); Christine Hurt, Evil Has A New Name (and 
a New Narrative):  Bernard Madoff, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 958 (2009). 
DOMBALAGIAN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2011  4:17 PM 
1280 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1265 
 
(e.g., credit cards) and design products that take advantage of such 
deviations.65  Likewise, to the extent that firms are able to tailor fi-
nancial products to the needs of an investor (whether at the time of 
the transaction or while the transaction is outstanding), firms may be 
able to discriminate between those investors who actively negotiate 
the standard terms in their transactions and those who seek to free-
ride off the monitoring costs of others but are unaware of the better 
deals available to those who ask. 66 
Naturally, regulation might be particularly appropriate when firms 
create a perceived asymmetry of sophistication in order to market 
their financial services.  At the time the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 was enacted, for example, securities and insurance brokers were 
commonly perceived to be professionals subject to professional duties 
of care.67  In a complementary vein, bankers have traditionally been 
viewed as conservative lenders who have designed financial products 
with a view to ensuring, at a minimum, that extensions of credit are 
adequately secured and that the borrower has the means to make 
timely payments of interest and principal.68  Minimum standards of 
professional competence certainly may be set through examination 
and qualification requirements for sales representatives and other as-
sociated persons of a financial services provider.  But when firms hold 
themselves out as providing “investment advice,”69 advertising “supe-
rior skill,”70 encouraging “trust,”71 or otherwise engage customers in 
                                                          
 65. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 70 (describing patterns of credit card 
use). 
 66. Id. at 9. 
 67. Gerald L. Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers—The NASD Suitability 
Rule, 51 MINN. L. REV. 233, 246 (1967) (noting an increased affiliation between 
NASD and securities firms); Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers 
and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 400, 408 (2010); Richard J. Wirth, My  
Customer’s Keeper:  The Search for a Universal Suitability Standard in the Sale of Life Insur-
ance, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 47, 78 (2002); see Steven A. Ramirez, The Professional Ob-
ligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law:  An Antidote for Bubbles, 70 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 527, 548, 554–58 (2002) (arguing that Congress intended to regulate brokerage 
and dealing by elevating professional standards and thereby facilitating malpractice 
claims under state law). 
 68. Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1272 (describing the Stiglitz-Weiss model of 
monopoly on credit historically used to restrict mortgage loans to all but most cre-
ditworthy borrowers). 
 69. Laby, supra note 67, at 413–17 (arguing that the broker-dealer exclusion from 
the definition of “investment adviser” in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) should be lost if 
a broker-dealer markets itself or otherwise holds itself out as an “adviser” in light of 
the connotation of the word). 
 70. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS 
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 4, at 694 (1st 
Sess. 1963) [hereinafter SEC SPECIAL STUDY] (“intricate merchandise”); Mundheim, 
supra note 21, at 450; Stuart D. Root, Suitability—The Sophisticated Investor—And  
Modern Portfolio Management, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287, 337 (1991). 
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one-on-one discussions about their financial needs and goals, it is  
debatable whether the risk of reputational harm is sufficient to en-
courage financial services providers to deal honestly with customers.72 
D. Conflicts of Interest 
Investors also are not necessarily able to appreciate, or adequately 
discount for, the many conflicts of interest to which financial services 
providers and their associated persons are subject.  The simplest of 
these is compensation:  To the extent that firms or sales representa-
tives are compensated on the basis of the number, size, or profitabili-
ty of the individual transactions they consummate, they have an in-
centive to push customers to execute more, larger, and more 
lucrative transactions.73  By contrast, when service firms or sales repre-
sentatives are compensated based on the size of the portfolio they 
oversee, there is a risk that they will adopt management strategies 
that allow them to devote increasingly less attention to individual 
transactions or customers.74  To the extent that these compensation 
                                                          
 71. DEBORAH DEMOTT, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP (1991).  
 72. Joseph A. Grundfest, The Future of United States Securities Regulation:  An Essay 
on Regulation in an Age of Technological Uncertainty, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 83, 105 (2001) 
(describing brokers as “gatekeepers” who could be liable for inappropriate trading 
on behalf of customers).  See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Haas, Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted 
Over the Internet:  Are They “Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 95 
(1989) (discussing the hesitance of investment banks to underwrite small issuer pub-
lic offerings for reputational concerns). 
 73. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives:  The Causes of Informational Failure 
and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1492–94 (1993) (con-
templating problems with the principal/agent relationship when swap traders are 
compensated by bonuses); Laby, supra note 67, at 406–07 (discussing the Tully-Levitt 
report on brokers’ transaction based compensation); Langevoort, supra note 61, at 
662 (positing that brokers’ quotas might spur selling that they would otherwise have 
reservations about); Poser, supra note 31, at 1524; see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(i)(VI) 
(excluding “banks” from the definition of “broker” in connection with certain third 
party arrangements as long as “bank employees do not receive incentive compensa-
tion for any brokerage transaction” other than nominal compensation “unless such 
employees are associated persons of a broker or dealer”); id.  
§ 78c(a)(4)(B)(ii)(excluding “banks” from the definition of “broker” in connection 
with certain trust activities provided, inter alia, that the bank “is chiefly compensated 
for such transactions, consistent with fiduciary principles and standards, on the basis 
of an administration or annual fee . . . , a percentage of assets under management, or 
a flat or capped per order processing fee”).  Similar practices occur in the mortgage 
finance market.  See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1263 (bonus for loan flip-
ping encourages flipping); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 31 (pushing sub-
prime mortgages to customers who qualify for prime mortgages).  The Dodd-Frank 
Act prohibits the payment to or receipt by a mortgage originator of any “compensa-
tion that varies based on the terms of the loan (other than the amount of the prin-
cipal).”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1403, 124 Stat. 1376, 2139 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b). 
 74. George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of Interprofessional Frontier Skir-
mishing:  Financial Planning Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 75, 106 (2007); Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers—What’s in a 
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structures mimic compensation structures in other consumer mar-
kets, the question becomes whether customers can make informed 
decisions about the frequency, size, or type of transactions best suited 
to their needs despite those conflicts.  
The nature of financial services, however, entails a much more 
complex and opaque web of relationships among service providers.  
Since the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (and even be-
fore), commercial banks have offered a variety of banking, securities, 
derivatives, and insurance services under a single umbrella.75  Invest-
ment banks and other securities firms, likewise, provide a range of 
underwriting, market making, derivatives, research, and advisory 
business under one roof.76  Even independent insurance companies, 
mutual fund companies, mortgage brokers, and other financial ser-
vices firms enter into a variety of arrangements with other financial 
firms for the marketing and distribution of their products.77  As a re-
sult, commentators focus the debate on the extent to which sales 
practice regulation is necessary to prevent firms from charging exces-
sive fees or steering customers to inferior products offered by their 
affiliates or business partners.78 
At a minimum, the transparency of such fees and relationships is 
important to ensuring that the market is able to discount for poten-
tial conflicts of interest; some commentators have argued that com-
petition may be sufficient, for example in the mutual fund industry, 
to ensure that fees are fairly set.79  Others argue that mere disclosure 
and competition are insufficient to protect investors, particularly if 
                                                          
Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 45 (2005); Christopher L. Peterson, Preemp-
tion, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents:  Are Federal Regulators 
Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 528 (2007); D. Bruce 
Johnsen, Myths About Mutual Fund Fees:  Economic Insights on Jones v. Harris, 35 J. 
CORP. L. 561, 568 (2010) (discussing SEC rulemaking efforts with respect to IAs and 
the fees they charge mutual funds). 
 75. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial 
Services Industry, 1975–2000:  Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 215, 219–22 (describing the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and 
the decades of Federal Reserve Board regulatory action that preceded it). 
 76. LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES:  MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 140 (2003) (defining “investment banks” as “[b]rokerage firms that 
engage in large capital transactions,” such as block trading, underwritings, and  
mergers and acquisitions). 
 77. Wilmarth, supra note 75, at 428–34. 
 78. See, e.g., Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 87–88 
(2010) (discussing commentary regarding a “suitability” requirement for broker-
dealer recommendations). 
 79. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 74, at 584 (arguing that mutual fund manage-
ment fees are set competitively).   
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customers are reliant on their brokers or financial advisers to guide 
them in the process of selecting particular transactions from a range 
of potential options.80  More extreme approaches to addressing these 
concerns might include a heightened duty to sanitize certain con-
flicts, such as through regulatory exemptions,81 or outright segrega-
tion of proprietary trading and public customer business.82 
II. THE REGULATORY TAXONOMY TODAY 
The extension of heightened sales practice standards to a broader 
range of financial transactions is simultaneously enticing and unnerv-
ing.  Even if recent events have proven the existing paradigms for re-
gulating investment transactions ineffectual, the difficulty lies not on-
ly in adapting the depth and scope of the fiduciary standard to the 
specific transactions that recur in customer disputes, but also in tai-
loring remedies that appropriately balance the multiple roles that 
commercial and investment banks, brokerage firms, insurance com-
panies, and other financial intermediaries play. 
Take, for example, the concept of the financial intermediary as  
“fiduciary.”  Borrowed from the law of trust and agency, the term re-
fers to the highest obligation of the agent to act loyally for the prin-
cipal’s benefit.83  The concept of fiduciary duty is sufficiently elastic in 
its depth and scope that it has been invoked in the context of simple 
securities transactions with individual investors as well as complex de-
rivatives transactions between investment banks and institutional in-
vestors.84  And yet, the concept of a fiduciary, if extended to financial 
                                                          
 80. See, e.g., Steven J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 (2003) (“For behavioralists, the single-minded focus of the SEC 
on disclosure presents a puzzle.  We doubt that disclosure is the optimal regulatory 
strategy if most investors suffer from cognitive biases.”); Usha Rodrigues & Mike Ste-
gemoller, Placebo Ethics:  A Study in Securities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. REV. 1, 10 
(2010) (criticizing the “soft” disclosure mandated by Section 406 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002). 
 81. See William P. Wade & Richard I. Loebl, Individual Prohibited Transaction Ex-
emptions:  The “Common Law”, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 185, 191–99 (1994) (de-
scribing the Department of Labor’s source of authority and process in issuing “pro-
hibited transaction exemptions” under ERISA).  
 82. See infra text accompanying notes 204–10 (discussing the pros and cons of 
segregation).  
 83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).  The formulation “best inter-
est” was introduced into fiduciary law to supplant the notion that a fiduciary acts in 
the “sole interest” of the party to whom the duty is owed, in part to reflect that con-
flicts of interest may exist.  See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 150 (2011). 
 84. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 190–92 (1963) 
(finding congressional intent to apply fiduciary standard to investment advisers); In 
re Daisy Sys. Corp., 97 F.3d 1171, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding investment bank 
owed fiduciary duty to client in structuring merger); Baker v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 
656 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237 (D. Mass. 2009) (holding the dismissal of a claim of breach 
of fiduciary duty against investment adviser in all-stock merger as inappropriate); 
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services providers with respect to all investment recommendations, 
would force a dramatic, and not necessarily salutary, reconfiguration 
of the multiple roles that securities brokers and dealers play in the  
financial marketplace. 
Other commentators have focused on extending the “suitability” 
requirement, long a staple of the law governing broker-dealers, to 
apply to ethically problematic conduct by purveyors of mortgage 
products and other financial services providers.85  One of the difficul-
ties, for example, in proscribing predatory practices in the mortgage 
lending market is the uniqueness of each borrower, the property to 
be mortgaged, and the expected duration of the loan.  Some scholars 
have often advocated that “suitability” obligations for financial servic-
es providers that originate or underwrite mortgages—particularly 
when such mortgages are bundled and fed to securities markets 
through the process of securitization—are more appropriate than the 
required “truth-in-lending” disclosures or prohibitions against  
narrowly defined “unfair and deceptive” lending practices.86  And yet 
federal bank regulators and credit rating agencies have resisted such 
initiatives, even after the collapse of the subprime lending market, in 
part out of the fear (however ironic) that stringent consumer finan-
cial protection laws might jeopardize the safety and soundness of the 
originating banks and the integrity of the market for mortgage-
backed securities.87 
The continued effectiveness of disclosure and antifraud rules in 
the context of both securities transactions and other consumer 
finance transactions is also routinely questioned.  Commentators 
have noted the mixed record of courts in granting equitable relief in 
disputes over inadequate disclosures in mortgage finance and the 
marketing of other banking products.88  In the context of securities 
transactions, courts presiding over private litigation of broker-
customer disputes have likewise undertaken a steady campaign over 
                                                          
Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953–54 (E.D. 
Mich. 1978) (holding that a broker owes no fiduciary duty unless transactions are 
discretionary or the broker has de facto control), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); 
Stokes v. Henson, 265 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding invest-
ment adviser owed individual clients fiduciary duty in providing investment advice). 
 85. See Macey et al., supra note 20, at 790–91, 837–38 (arguing that the applica-
tion of the suitability requirement might have stopped homeowners from obtaining 
subprime mortgages); Wirth, supra note 67, at 47–48, 81–85 (analyzing the applica-
tion of suitability requirement to insurance contracts). 
 86. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1317–63 (2002) (arguing for the 
application of the duty of suitability to the subprime mortgage market). 
 87. See supra note 27 (making the case against applying the suitability doctrine). 
 88. See infra text accompanying note 146–149. 
DOMBALAGIAN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2011  4:17 PM 
2011] THE ESSENCE OF DUTY 1285 
the past several decades to shift the burden onto aggrieved investors 
to establish defendants’ consciousness of wrongdoing and a right to 
rely on the defendants’ representations as a predicate to recovery.89  
However justifiable it may be, the rigorous burden-shifting with re-
spect to scienter and reliance in suits between financial services pro-
viders and their customers weakens incentives for securities brokers 
to engage customers in a forthright discussion of the risks and re-
wards of particular investments, particularly when compulsory arbi-
tration of securities disputes eliminates any transparency in how this 
body of law is applied.90 
The following three sections examine the fiduciary standard as  
currently applied to investment advisers and in other contexts, with a 
view to contrasting it with the suitability doctrine and the use of af-
firmative disclosures. 
A. The Fiduciary Standard  
The scope and depth of fiduciary duties holds the greatest promise 
for ensuring that providers of financial services act in the best inter-
ests of their clients, even as the imposition of duties of loyalty and 
care on all investment transactions poses a variety of theoretical and 
practical problems.  The duty of loyalty in general “requires that the 
agent subordinate the agent’s interests to those of the principal and 
place the principal’s interests first as to matters connected with the 
agency relationship,” although such arrangements may be modified 
by mutual agreement.91  The duty of loyalty thus subjects arrange-
ments such as dual agency or self-dealing to heightened scrutiny to 
ensure that the principal’s interests are not subordinated to that of 
the agent or another.92  The duty of care has traditionally required fi-
duciaries to manage the affairs of the principal with the “care, com-
petence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar cir-
cumstances,” taking into account any “[s]pecial skills or knowledge 
possessed by [the] agent.”93 
In the context of financial services, clear examples of relationships 
consistent with fiduciary obligations include custodial services or asset 
management:  When the custodian or manager has discretionary  
authority over investment, duties of loyalty and care are necessary to 
                                                          
 89. See infra text accompanying notes 155–156. 
 90. See infra text accompanying notes 150–154, and 176–181.   
 91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006). 
 92. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 67–68, at 140–
144 (3rd ed. 2001) (describing the duties of an agent when transacting with the prin-
cipal or as a dual agent). 
 93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006). 
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protect the interests of beneficial owners who may otherwise have li-
mited legal power to direct the manner in which funds are invested 
or that fees are set for such services.  Both the Investment Advisers 
Act and state law generally recognize that a person who manages the 
funds of others is a fiduciary.94  The SEC staff’s report notes that 
91.2% of accounts managed by investment advisers registered with 
the SEC confer some discretionary authority on the investment advis-
er.95 
Courts have also found that securities or insurance brokers may 
have fiduciary duties when they recommend transactions to custom-
ers, for example, when customers have reposed such “trust and con-
fidence” in the broker that the broker exercises de facto discretionary 
authority over the management of the customer’s account.96  By and 
large, however, brokers and other transactional agents are subject to 
fiduciary duties under common law only to the extent that they ex-
ecute specific tasks as agents for the account of and subject to the di-
rection of the principal,97 such as placing orders, executing, clearing, 
and settling transactions, and holding customer funds or securities. 
Fiduciary duties appeal to those commentators who doubt the effi-
cacy of ex ante regulation through rules or principles-based ongoing 
                                                          
 94. See Beacon Hill CBO II, Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC, 249 F. Supp. 2d 
268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U.S. 11, 17 (1979) (applying federal law); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963) (applying federal law); Lowenbraun v. Rothschild, 
685 F. Supp. 336, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying New York law); Pierce v. Richard El-
lis & Co., 310 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) (applying New York law)) (rely-
ing on both the Investment Advisers Act and New York law) , aff’d on other grounds, 89 
F. App’x 749, 750 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 95. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 6–7.  The remaining 8.8 percent of accounts 
are nondiscretionary in nature.  Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 
953–54 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (recognizing a fiduciary duty for brokers handling a dis-
cretionary account), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Skel-
ly, 442 F.3d 94, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2006) (asserting that a fiduciary relationship between 
broker and customer “most commonly . . . exists in situations in which a broker has 
discretionary authority over the customer’s account”); Trumball Invs., Ltd. I v.  
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 436 F.3d 443, 445–46 (4th Cir. 2006) (comparing non-
discretionary and discretionary investment accounts); Romano v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding no breach of fi-
duciary duty because customer exerted control over his nondiscretionary account); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Heritage Capital Advisory Servs., Ltd., 823 
F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding no fiduciary duty for a broker operating a 
nondiscretionary account). 
 97. See Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d 933  
(2d Cir. 1998); see also De Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (noting that for nondiscretionary accounts, a broker only owes a customer 
a fiduciary duty “[o]n a transaction-by-transaction basis”).  See generally Langevoort, 
supra note 61, at 676, 677 n.150 (analyzing how the scope of relationship is deter-
mined when a customer is sophisticated but opts to rely). 
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supervision.98  Ex ante rulemaking in the financial industry, as scho-
lars routinely note, may be efficient when regulators are able readily 
to accumulate information about the types of abuses frequently per-
petrated by issuers, sellers, and sponsors of financial products and to 
develop succinct disclosures or procedures that can check their  
recurrence;99 ex ante rules perform less well when malefactors easily 
circumvent each new iteration of rules or when the burdens of disclo-
sure deter new entrants or the provision of new services.100  While on-
going supervision under a principles-based regime may be appropri-
ate for safety and soundness regulation,101 it would be extraordinarily 
complicated to extend that model to ongoing supervision of clients’ 
investment accounts for the purpose of identifying exposure to exces-
sive investment risk.102 
                                                          
 98. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 102–04 (contrasting “principles-based” invest-
ment adviser regulation with “rules-based” broker-dealer regulation); John C. Coffee, 
Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC:  Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 707, 757–58 (2009) (criticizing the “rules/principles continuum”).  But see Law-
rence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in 
Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1492 (2007) 
(speculating that the phenomenon of “global rhetoric championing principles-based 
systems” is “due to a combination of a regulatory desire to provide a counterweight 
to demand for rules, a quest to rejuvenate ethics, and a desire to distinguish a juris-
diction’s legal-financial products” and arguing that if it is “infeasible to establish a 
principles-based system of corporate law, securities regulation, or accounting, then it 
is misleading to promote the possibility”). 
 99. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 74 (noting the greater ability of regulato-
ry agencies, as opposed to courts, to distinguish fees in credit contracts that 
represent “liquidated damages” and punitive fees that are unenforceable). 
 100. See Langevoort, supra note 61, at 673–74 (describing the costs of regulatory 
intervention).  As discussed below, regulators have prescribed voluminous disclo-
sures in connection with individual securities, financing transactions, and other fi-
nancial products, and yet the cumulative effect of these disclosures is not only to 
overload the capability of the investor to make a rational decision but also to shield 
the offering firm from liability if sufficient meaningful cautionary disclosures have 
been made.  See infra text accompanying note 129. 
 101. See, e.g., Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Uniform Finan-
cial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,021, 67,022 (Dec. 19, 1996) (describ-
ing the “internal rating system used by the Federal supervisory agencies and State su-
pervisory agencies for evaluating the soundness of financial institutions on a uniform 
basis and for identifying those institutions requiring special supervisory attention or 
concern”). 
 102. Of course, regulators may conduct periodic inspections of firms to target 
specific risks, such as scams targeting the elderly or particularly vulnerable segments 
of the population.  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1941 (2010) (to be codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 5537) (requiring the CFPB’s Office of Financial Literacy to establish a 
program to make grants available to states or state securities commissions, insurance 
commissions, and consumer protection agencies to protect senior citizens from cer-
tain misleading designations or misleading or fraudulent marketing with respect to 
advising or servicing individuals over the age of sixty-two); David Adam Friedman, 
Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 45, 73–74 (2007) (examining the 
practice of random hyper-protection for certain groups).  In addition, regulators re-
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The power of fiduciary duties has also traditionally lain in the 
sweeping equitable relief that courts may employ not only to com-
pensate principals for harm suffered as a breach of duty, but also to 
deter misconduct even in the absence of harm to the principal.103  
Thus, for example, a breach of the duty of loyalty might require not 
only that the agent compensate the principal for any harm suffered 
as a result of self-dealing, but also require the agent to disgorge to the 
principal any “secret profits” or other financial benefit obtained as a 
result of the breach.104  The severity of these remedies traditionally 
has been explained as a tool for punishing or deterring disloyalty by 
the agent, or more recently, as a means of placing the onus on the 
agent to obtain the principal’s informed consent prior to affecting 
mutually beneficial transactions.105  In this respect, the fiduciary duty 
performs a suppletive role—filling in terms most friendly to the prin-
cipal in the absence of specifically negotiated terms between the 
agent and the principal. 
Fiduciary duties are also notable for the willingness of courts to dis-
regard contractual arrangements when they have reason to suspect 
that the fiduciary is not acting with the principal at arm’s length.  
Congress has imposed a fiduciary duty on advisers to mutual funds, 
pension funds, or other collective investment funds, even when they 
purport to contract at arm’s length with fund representatives, to the 
extent that such funds that lend themselves to exploitation by the fi-
nancial services provider.106  Similarly, financial services providers 
                                                          
quire conversations and customer complaints to be preserved as evidence in subse-
quent investigations.  See, e.g., NASD Rule 3110(d),  
FINRA Manual (CCH) 17,360, at 17,361 (2009), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=
3734 (requiring record of customer “complaints”). 
 103. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1056–61 
(2007) (describing “[t]he ‘substantial factor’ standard for loss causation . . . as a 
‘prophylactic rule intended to remove all incentive to breach’”); D. Gordon Smith, 
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1493–97 (2002) 
(arguing that the availability of restitution, and specifically disgorgement, is neces-
sary for a beneficiary to be able to control a fiduciary).  But see discussion infra Part 
III.A (noting that clients of an investment adviser have no private right of action 
against the investment adviser for breach of the fiduciary duty created by section 206 
of the Investment Advisers Act). 
 104. FRANKEL, supra note 83, at 254–56; see, e.g., Coburn v. Warner, 110 F. Supp. 
850, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (concerning secret commission); O’Malley v. Boris, 742 
A.2d 845, 847 (Del. 1999) (requiring disclosure of broker’s receipt of ownership in-
terest in exchange for transfer of customer accounts under Delaware law). 
 105. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 83, at 101–02 (identifying morality, punishment, 
and self-protection by entrusting parties as mechanisms that limit misconduct by fi-
duciaries). 
 106. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (defining who is a “fiduciary” under 
ERISA); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a)(authorizing the SEC to bring an action for “breach of 
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contracting with corporate representatives may be held responsible 
for transactions effected by corporate employees who exceed their 
authority or violate internal controls.107  In some cases, clearing bro-
kers have been held responsible for breaches of fiduciary duty by in-
troducing brokers on whose behalf the clearing brokers carry securi-
ties accounts, on the theory that the clearing broker had a duty to 
monitor such accounts.108 
Whether the concept of the fiduciary can be extended to other 
areas of financial sales practice regulation is debatable, as discussed 
in Parts III and IV below.  Many investment transactions offered by 
financial services providers possess the characteristics of arm’s-length 
transactions:  Dealer sales from inventory, extensions of credit under 
a mortgage or margin loan, and tailored derivatives contracts all in-
volve an arm’s-length relationship.109  Moreover, fiduciary standards, 
particularly to the extent they encompass a duty of care, have never-
theless typically been associated with investment professionals with de 
jure or de facto discretion to trade on behalf of client accounts.110  
                                                          
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered investment 
company for which such person so serves or acts,” inter alia, “as officer, director, 
member of any ... investment adviser”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 731, 124 Stat. 1376, 1703, 1708–09 
(to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s) (imposing a duty on swap dealers “to act in the best 
interests” of, and “make reasonable efforts” to obtain such information as is neces-
sary to carry out that duty to, an advisory client that is a federal, state, or municipal 
agency, an employee benefit plan or governmental plan under ERISA, or an en-
dowment); id. § 764, at 1784, 1790–91 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8) (amend-
ing section 15F(h)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by imposing the same 
duty on security-based swap dealers). 
 107. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906, 917 (W. Va. 
1995) (holding that whether Morgan had knowingly aided and abetted a violation by 
state employees of a state statute barring the use of state funds for “speculation” was a 
question for the jury); see also Langevoort, supra note 61, at 697–99 (intimating that 
such a doctrine could become “something of a loose cannon” imposing a duty on 
brokers to refrain from a transaction anytime an institutional buyer seems to be act-
ing inconsistently with an objective standard of the institution’s needs); Markham, 
supra note 22, at 365 (describing Drexel’s liability in CFTC proceeding); Rosenthal, 
supra note 40, at 1264 (“[I]t was not the absence of regulation that led to . . . large 
derivatives losses, but rather the continuing absence of internal corporate controls . . 
. .”). 
 108. Black & Gross, supra note 62, at 1042. 
 109. See, e.g., Grant E. Buerstetta, Creating a Flexible Fiduciary Duty Rule for Banks En-
tering into Proprietary Derivatives Contracts, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 395, 403–08 (1996) 
(distinguishing the bank-to-depositor relationship, where traditionally there is no 
fiduciary duty, from the bank-to-customer relationship in which investment products 
are sold). 
 110. Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083, 
1090–96 (2007) (arguing that a fiduciary duty should not be imposed on analysts, in 
part because “analysts do not exercise discretionary authority over the property of 
their institutional and issuer clients”); Karmel, supra note 31, at 1273 (asserting that a 
firm that “exercises actual or de facto control over a customer’s account because of a 
customer’s trust and confidence . . . may owe a fiduciary obligation to the custom-
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For example, it is difficult to hold a fiduciary liable for the failure to 
take care in making investment recommendations, unless it has the 
authority to manage the client’s entire portfolio—and thus assume 
overall responsibility for appropriate allocation of investments and 
diversification.111 
B. Disclosure-Based Approaches 
A second approach to characterizing the relationship between a fi-
nancial services provider and its client is an arm’s-length transaction, 
subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as aug-
mented by enumerated affirmative disclosures (or implied represen-
tations) about the quality of the investment and the terms governing 
the transaction.  At a minimum, this approach would prohibit firms 
from making material misstatements about the character of a transac-
tion.112  Thus, for products such as swap transactions among sophisti-
cated parties, which have not historically been subject to federal se-
curities law or other product-specific disclosure obligations, litigants 
have relied upon common law concepts of contract or fraud to estab-
lish a right to relief.113  For many products, however, federal or state 
law requires the disclosure of extensive additional information to cus-
tomers prior to or at the time the transaction is consummated.114 
Such disclosures can serve multiple purposes.115  In addition to ad-
dressing the imbalance of information between the financial services 
provider and the customer, disclosures necessarily disrupt the selling 
                                                          
er[,]” and citing older cases referring to “unfair dealing”); see Applicability of the In-
vestment Advisers Act to Certain Brokers and Dealers, Securities Act Release No. 
15215, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 640, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,176, 47,177 (Oct. 
13, 1978) (interpreting the Investment Advisers Act exclusion for broker-dealers as 
not applying to broker-dealers who “almost exclusively” manage discretionary ac-
counts). 
 111. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1) (2010) (describing the duty of a fidu-
ciary to an employee benefit plan); Jerry W. Markham, Privatizing Social Security, 38 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 747, 796–98 (2001) (discussing evolution of prudent man rule and 
DOL standards for portfolio management); Wirth, supra note 67, at 78–79 (discuss-
ing insurance producers). 
 112. See Hu, supra note 23, at 2326–28 (explaining the “no-lying” category). 
 113. See S. Lawrence Polk & Bryan M. Ward, A Guide to the “Regulatory No Man’s 
Land” of Over-The-Counter Interest Rate Swaps, 124 BANKING L.J. 397, 402–04 (2007) 
(discussing the legal regime governing swap transactions). 
 114. See, e.g., Joseph U. Schorer, The Credit Card Act of 2009:  Credit Card Reform and 
the Uneasy Case for Disclosure, 127 BANKING L.J. 924, 937–38 (2010) (describing, among 
other things, the new federal law’s mandate of more explicit disclosure to credit card 
users about the long-term cost of making only minimum payments). 
 115. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 23, at 2321–22 (noting that disclosure “facilitate[s] 
information gathering and reduce[s] errors stemming from rational or irrational de-
cisions to forego information”). 
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process and give the customer an opportunity to consider more care-
fully the terms of the transaction:116  In an era where signing on the 
dotted line has been replaced by electronic records of oral consent, 
the delay between sales pitch and confirmation has all but disap-
peared.  The effectiveness of disclosure at upending the sales pitch 
depends upon timing; in some contexts, law and regulation require 
significant ex ante disclosure of the terms, or require firms to offer 
clients a “cooling off” period during which a transaction may be res-
cinded.117  Similarly, for some products, disclosure must be made 
concurrently with each individual transaction consummated, whereas 
for others, a “blanket” disclosure governing all subsequent transac-
tions is sufficient to relieve the service provider of any continuing ob-
ligation.118 
Disclosure regimes are much more common in financial services, 
in part because of the relative ease with which regulators can stan-
dardize what information needs to be disclosed and the relative cer-
tainty they provide the financial services industry (not to mention 
bank supervisors who view liability as a risk to safety and soundness) 
as to what their statutory or regulatory obligations are.  To illustrate, 
the issuance of mortgages or home equity lines of credit is governed 
by elaborate disclosures under rules promulgated by the Federal Re-
serve Board for banking institutions and by the Federal Trade Com-
mission (“FTC”) for non-bank originators pursuant to statutes such as 
the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),119 the Real Estate Settlement Pro-
cedures Act (“RESPA”),120 and the Home Ownership and Equity Pro-
                                                          
 116. Langevoort, supra note 61, at 693. 
 117. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1187–88 (2003) (describing legally-mandated 
“cooling-off periods for [certain] consumer decisions” as examples of “libertarian 
paternalism”).  Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8(b) (2010) (requiring delivery of pre-
liminary prospectus to any person who is expected to receive a confirmation of sale 
in a public offering of securities by a nonreporting issuer at least 48 hours prior to 
the sending of such confirmation), with 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2006) (prohibiting 
the carriage of any security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale in con-
nection with a registered offering, unless accompanied or preceded by a statutory 
prospectus under section 10(a) of the Securities Act). 
 118. See Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, [2005 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,051, at 76,978, 76,988 n.13, 76,989 (Aug. 31, 
2005) (granting no-action relief permitting the use of blanket global consents for 
certain principal transactions but noting the Commission’s position that “[b]lanket 
disclosure and consent, rather than transaction-by-transaction consent, generally will 
not suffice because of the potential for self-dealing that can be associated with each 
principal transaction”); see also Black, supra note 74, at 38–39 (“The disclosure must 
include the facts necessary to alert the client to the adviser’s potential conflict of in-
terest; it is not sufficient for the investment adviser merely to provide a blanket dis-
closure and general consent.”) 
 119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67f. 
 120. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–17 (2006). 
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tection Act (“HOEPA”).121  Special disclosure rules exist for the  
marketing of contracts sold on futures exchanges122 and options  
exchanges,123 and for transactions in penny stock,124 variable annui-
ties,125 and other specialty products.  And of course, federal securities 
law imposes extensive affirmative disclosures governing both primary 
offerings of and secondary markets in individual securities and mu-
tual funds,126 in addition to catch-all liability for securities fraud under 
section 17(a) of the Securities Act127 and Rule 10b-5 under the  
Exchange Act.128 
One pervasive critique of disclosure regimes is that they tend over 
time to inundate investors with information.  Several commentators 
have echoed concerns that securities and other regulatory disclosures 
have reached the cognitive limits of the individual investor.129  Inves-
                                                          
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 1639; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1305–09 (describ-
ing disclosure requirements under TILA, RESPA, and HOEPA). 
 122. 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (2010) (requiring the distribution of “Risk Disclosure State-
ment” by futures commission merchants and introducing brokers); see also Protection 
of Commodity Customers; Risk Disclosure by Futures Commission Merchants to Cus-
tomers, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,723, 52,723–25 (Nov. 23, 1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
(proposing an amendment to section 1.55 of the 17 C.F.R. to clarify that risk disclo-
sure statement is not exhaustive of a futures commission merchant’s duty to disclose 
all material information to customers under applicable state law); Sotos & Bowen, 
supra note 30, at 306 (explaining the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on 
Commodity Futures Trading Professionals that new commodity futures customers 
should be given a risk disclosure statement). 
 123. FINRA Rule 2360, FINRA Manual (CCH) 4137, at 4142 (2009) (governing 
options), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6306. 
 124. Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.15g-9(a) (2010); see also Langevoort, supra note 61, at 687 (outlining the sub-
stance and timing of required disclosure for penny stock transactions). 
 125. FINRA Rule 2330, FINRA Manual (CCH) 4133-2 (2009), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=12069&
element_id=8824&highlight=2330#r12069 (governing purchases and exchanges of 
deferred variable annuities). 
 126. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1961, 1968–70 (2010) (describing the SEC’s disclosure requirements for mutual 
funds). 
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006). 
 128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 129. See Black & Gross, supra note 37, at 485 (“[D]isclosure requirements have be-
come increasingly complex . . . .”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Comment, Text Anxiety, 
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 305 (1986) (arguing that it is normal and reasonable for “con-
sumers who are faced with the dense text of form contracts” to “respond by refusing 
to read”); Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to Securities 
Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 802–06 (2007) (analyzing disclosure regulations un-
der the First Amendment); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:  Information Overload 
and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (voicing con-
cern about “information overload” in securities regulation); A. C. Pritchard, The SEC 
at 70:  Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1087–89 (2005) (criticizing 
the SEC’s “[f]ixation” on disclosure); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Pa-
radigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (arguing that “disclo-
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tors who do not perceive that the benefits of digesting required  
disclosures exceed the potential costs may simply ignore such mate-
rials out of rational apathy, or assume that they can free-ride off of 
the diligence of other investors receiving such information.130  Regu-
lators may regularly attempt to redefine what is material to permit a 
greater degree of abstraction,131 or to simplify disclosures so that  
persons of a specific reading level and sophistication can compre-
hend the material terms.132  Such simplification comes at a cost, how-
ever, since reliance on abstract categories or classifications (for  
example, in the naming of products) can create incentives for finan-
cial services providers to game the system.133 
Disclosure requirements also do not necessarily provide informa-
tion to the consumer that is of practical use.134  To the extent that we 
                                                          
sure can be insufficient to remedy the information asymmetry between the originator 
and its investors”). 
 130. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street:  A Voucher Fi-
nancing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 278–79 (2003) (address-
ing rational apathy in terms of shareholder governance); Nathan Knutt, Note,  Execu-
tive Compensation Regulation:  Corporate America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 503–
04 (2005) (addressing both rational apathy and the free rider problem); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding 
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1171 (1981) (explaining rational apathy and 
its relation to the free rider problem). 
 131. Fanto, supra note 22, at 171–78 (discussing the SEC’s initiatives to modify 
mutual fund disclosure formats to improve comparability of firm disclosures). 
 132. Cf. id. at 164–171 (discussing the SEC’s “plain English” initiative and the ten-
sion between communicating complex information to sophisticated investors and 
educating the least sophisticated investor); Elizabeth C. Yen, Mortgage Loan Disclosure 
and Other Pre-closing Regulatory Requirements:  Do They Fulfill Their Intended Consumer Pro-
tection Purposos?  124 BANKING L.J. 131, 132–33 (discussing reading level for credit 
card disclosures); see also John Beshears et al., How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Indi-
viduals’ Mutual Fund Choices? 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
14859, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14859 (finding no evidence 
that the SEC’s simplified summary prospectus for mutual funds affects investors’ 
choice of portfolio). 
 133. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010) (providing rules governing “money mar-
ket” mutual funds); Investment Company Advertising:  Target Date Retirement Fund 
Names and Marketing, Securities Act Release No. 9126, Exchange Act Release No. 
62300, Investment Company Act Release No. 29301, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920 (June 23, 
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 270) (proposing rules relating to re-
tirement funds that include a “target date” in their name); In re Civil and Military In-
vestors Mutual Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 2723, 38 S.E.C. 451, 
458–59 (June 9, 1958) (declaring company’s name to be deceptive and misleading, 
in violation of section 35(d) of Investment Company Act of 1940, as implying, among 
other things, that company’s investment program was particularly suited to meet in-
vestment needs of government personnel). 
 134. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 23, at 2373–74 (critiquing the usefulness of certain 
historical data on investment returns); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:  A 
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2377 (1998) (“Researchers 
found no stock price effect when firms disclosed the newly mandated replacement 
cost information, suggesting that investors did not find the SEC’s mandated disclo-
sure useful for valuing firms.”); see also Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure 
as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1129 (2007) (concluding that a suc-
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might expect investors to rely on the firm’s own representations as to 
the risk of a particular transaction, qualitative disclosures about poss-
ible risk factors, expressed through the copious use of modal verbs, 
are not helpful in making an informed judgment.135  For example, a 
disclosure that market makers may not support a product in the fu-
ture, or that interest rates may rise in connection with an adjustable-
rate mortgage, convey no information about the firm’s assessment of 
those risks.  As such, it may be difficult for the ordinary investor to 
discount for such risks when making an investment decision.  On the 
other hand, commentators rightly note that sophisticated customers 
can negotiate for such information136 and the disclosure of the firm’s 
own analysis of the merits of a transaction might inappropriately lead 
investors to believe that they are entitled to certain returns.137 
Moreover, as several commentators have suggested, disclosures 
about the merits of an individual product or transaction may not be 
helpful absent references to comparable products.138  To demon-
strate, the need for disclosure of comparable products is frequently 
invoked in the context of marketing subprime mortgage products to 
borrowers qualifying for prime mortgages,139 or in the context of  
excessive fees charged by actively managed funds versus passively ma-
naged index funds.140  Disclosures about comparable products, how-
ever, could conceivably raise issues of freedom of speech141 if firms are 
compelled to make disclosures that contravene their own judgment 
                                                          
cessful disclosure system must articulate why the information sought “will be useful to 
an underlying regulatory goal and why it is not currently available”). 
 135. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 61, at 692 (advocating disclosure of the 
“probability”—not just the “possibility”—of particular risks). 
 136.  Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securi-
ties Markets: Evidence From Europe In 1999—Part I, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 685–86 (2001) 
(observing the quality of disclosure documents that accompany “International-style 
Offerings” to institutional investors in Europe and the due diligence work that un-
derlies this documentation are “of a much higher quality than the formal disclosure 
requirements of most, if not all, European countries” because “ ‘the market requires’ 
the higher level of disclosure” institutions are accustomed to receiving in offerings 
under U.S. law). 
 137. Hu, supra note 23, at 2375. 
 138. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1280 (noting that “the typical victims of 
predatory lenders” are unaware of their options).  But see Castillo v. Dean Witter Dis-
cover & Co., [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,249, at 91,091, 
91,097 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (explaining that a broker has no obligation to dis-
close information about competitors’ products). 
 139. Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1264, 1264 n.20 (discussing “naïve 
borrowers” who are tricked into borrowing costlier loans). 
 140. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 23, at 2359–60 (proposing greater disclosure of quan-
titative information about performance relative to other instruments). 
 141. See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital 
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 51–61 (1989) (discussing compulsory and prohibited 
speech). 
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(or their own financial interests) when regulators’ determination of 
what constitutes comparable products is subject to dispute.142 
Furthermore, applying disclosure requirements at the time of a 
transaction appears to foreclose the possibility that a firm has any 
continuing duty to advise the customer as to material information 
that may trigger a decision to liquidate the position or to modify the 
terms of the transaction.  Courts have generally rejected the argu-
ment that a pattern of providing ongoing investment advice with re-
spect to customer trading may create a duty to provide complete or 
updated advice.143  It would be even more difficult to conceive of a 
requirement that mortgage brokers or bank representatives review 
the accounts of mortgagors to determine whether refinancing is ap-
propriate, or for insurance brokers to recommend that customers 
scale back coverage as their personal circumstances change.144 
While enforcement actions based on disclosure violations may  
generate fines and injunctions to deter future violations, they do not 
necessarily compensate aggrieved investors for the entirety of their 
loss.145  Unlike regulations governing pure credit products in which 
courts may be willing to protect customers from paying excessive rate 
hikes or charges under theories of unconscionability or lack of good 
faith, or pursuant to statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts or 
practices,146 the typical investor claim involves an asset that may have 
declined in value through no fault of the financial intermediary.147  
When disclosure violations committed by a financial intermediary are 
discovered after the transaction has been consummated, a court must 
                                                          
 142. See, e.g., SEC v. Wall Street Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (“[D]isclosure requirements have been upheld in regulation of commercial 
speech even when the government has not shown that ‘absent the required disclo-
sure, [the speech would be false or deceptive] or that the disclosure requirement 
serves some substantial government interest other than preventing decep-
tion.’”(alteration in original)) . 
 143. See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 
2002) (“The giving of advice triggers no ongoing duty to do so.”). 
 144. See Wirth, supra note 67, at 59 n.42 (noting the New York Insurance Depart-
ment’s opposition to a proposed duty to suggest amendments to life insurance poli-
cies). 
 145.  The Dodd-Frank Act amended the “fair funds” provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act to permit the SEC to direct that civil monetary penalties collected from 
parties found in violation of the securities laws be added to a disgorgement fund or 
other fund for the benefit of the victims of a violation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (as 
amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 929B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1852 (2010)). 
 146. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 71–72 (discussing unconscionability 
and penalty defenses). 
 147. Langevoort, supra note 61, at 628 (characterizing the “mutual finger-pointing 
that often occurs in disputes between stockbrokers and their customers” as a “pre-
dictable drama in the field of investments”). 
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decide not only whether the intermediary should disgorge its revenue 
from the transaction, but also whether the intermediary should ab-
sorb the full amount of the loss to the customer attributable to the 
violation.148  Courts may be unwilling to impose equitable remedies 
such as rescission or restitution, even when expressly authorized by 
federal or state law,149 absent egregious circumstances. 
To the extent that investment transactions can be expected to fail 
routinely, courts may impose a gauntlet of obstacles to avoid undoing 
the risk-shifting objectives of the investment transaction based on  
inaccurate or incomplete disclosure.150  For instance, courts may be 
reluctant to brand novel conduct as deceptive or fraudulent.151  In the 
context of securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange 
Act, courts have required plaintiffs to prove the defendant’s  
consciousness of the disclosure violation (scienter) and have permit-
ted defendants to use disclosure documents containing cautionary 
language to defeat plaintiff’s reliance on oral representations.152  
Courts also focus on the sophistication of the investor in determining 
the reasonableness of his right to rely on statements of the broker 
that conflict with written disclosures,153 thus ironically shifting the  
                                                          
 148. See, e.g., In re Mutual Funds Investment Litig., 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(permitting mutual fund shareholders to bring Rule 10b-5 class action against in-
vestment adviser for misrepresentations made in prospectus with respect to “market 
timing”), cert. granted sub nom. Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 
130 S. Ct. 3499 (June 28, 2010). 
 149. For example, courts have imposed obstacles in the face of customers seeking 
rescissionary relief under TILA and other mortgage lending disclosure laws.  See Ro-
bert Murken, Comment, Can’t Get No Satisfaction?  Revising How Courts Rescind Home 
Equity Loans Under the Truth in Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 457, 465 (2004) (describ-
ing many courts’ underlying “concern that the statutory scheme would impose ine-
quitably harsh forfeitures on creditors”). 
 150. See, e.g., Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securities 
Litigators Need To Know, 62 BUS. LAW. 1281, 1285–87 (2007) (discussing “75 defense 
doctrines that courts have used in recent years to dismiss securities claims” at prelim-
inary stages of securities class action litigation, based, inter alia, on the defendant’s 
alleged role, the nature and materiality of the disclosure violation, the defendant’s 
state of mind, the reasonableness of plaintiff’s reliance, and the relationship between 
the violation and loss). 
 151. Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2008–10 
(2006); Friedman, supra note 103, at 58–59.  
 152. Langevoort, supra note 61, at 677, 681 (discussing the right-to-rely and duty 
to read). 
 153. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1028 
(4th Cir. 1997) (weighing eight factors to determine institutional investor’s justifia-
ble reliance: the “sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and securi-
ties matters”; “existence of long standing business or personal relationships”; “access 
to relevant information”; “existence of a fiduciary relationship”; “concealment of the 
fraud”; “opportunity to detect the fraud”; “whether the plaintiff initiated the stock 
transaction or sought to expedite the transaction”; and  “generality or specificity of 
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focus of inquiry away from the intermediary’s conduct and represen-
tations.154 
C. Ethical or Professional Obligations 
A third approach attempts to stake a middle ground between the 
undue paternalism associated with fiduciary duties and the assump-
tion of sophistication and rational decision making associated with 
disclosure-based approaches.155  This approach finds its best expres-
sion in the National Association of Securities Dealers’ (“NASD”)  
suitability rule.156  Under the rule, firms are generally required to 
“make reasonable efforts to obtain information” regarding a custom-
er’s financial status, tax status, investment objectives, and other in-
formation used or considered to be reasonable in making recom-
mendations.157  The rule then generally requires member securities 
firms making recommendations to a customer to “have reasonable 
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such 
customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such cus-
tomer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situa-
tion and needs.”158 
As a rule of a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”), the suitability 
requirement is cast as a professional obligation grounded in “just and 
equitable principles of trade.”159  Analogous rules appear in the rule-
books of other securities SROs, such as the New York Stock Ex-
                                                          
the misrepresentations”); Poser, supra note 31, at 1514–15 (absolute or rebuttable 
presumption). 
 154. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 61, at 684–685 (suggesting that the “principal 
role of the duty to read” is to deal with the difficulty of making credibility determina-
tions about a broker’s oral representations to customers at the time of the recom-
mendation and that brokers can “manipulate” the customer’s motivation not to read 
by delaying delivery of any required documentation until the “customer’s commit-
ment to the investment is securely anchored”). 
 155. See generally, Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities 
Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1570 (1999) (setting out the two most important 
considerations in determining whether a customer is making independent decisions:  
the customer’s capability to evaluate investment risk independently and the custom-
er’s exercise of independent judgment in evaluating a broker-dealer’s recommenda-
tion); Macey et al., supra note 20, at 815–21 (discussing the doctrine of suitability, 
which requires that broker-dealers only recommend to their clients those financial 
transactions that are suitable given the customer’s level of financial sophistication, 
current investments, financial status, personal circumstances, and so on). 
 156. NASD Rule 2310, FINRA Manual (CCH) 17,155 (2009), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=
3638. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6) (2006) (“just and equitable principles of 
trade”); SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 70, at 309 (describing the NASD’s “suitability” 
rule as a specific provision to control violations of this “general ethical standard”). 
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change160 and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.161  In the 
insurance industry, suitability requirements appear in various state 
insurance codes162 as well as in the recommended suitability guide-
lines of industry bodies such as the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (“NAIC”).163  Suitability requirements may also reflect 
a desire to protect firms from the reputational or credit risk of cus-
tomer defaults or misconduct, as does the OCC’s appropriateness re-
quirement for derivative transactions effected by national banks.164  
Other regulators have historically disavowed any suitability rule,165 al-
though courts may imply such duties as part of a financial services 
provider’s fiduciary duty.166 
The clear benefit of an industry standard of care is that it focuses 
on the firm’s conduct, rather than its motivations or conflicts of in-
terest, in an objectively verifiable way.  Firms are thus invited to de-
velop internal guidelines for the risk characteristics of particular in-
vestment transactions and to identify the classes of customers to 
which they will be offered based on information gathered through 
questionnaires and other documents submitted by the customer.167  
In both banking and securities firms, these internal controls can then 
be evaluated by examiners—this can be done on an ongoing basis 
                                                          
 160. N.Y.S.E. Rule 405(1), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2405, at 3697 (1984), availa-
ble at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer. 
asp?selectednode=chp_1_5_7_6&manual=%2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fnyse-rules%2F.  The 
origin of the rule was the self-protection of the broker.  Markham, supra note 22, at 
369. 
 161. MSRB Rule G-19, MSRB Manual (CCH) ¶ 3591, at 4891 (2003), available at 
http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-
19.aspx. 
 162. Wirth, supra note 68, at 56–57 (noting the range of “suitability” tests). 
 163. THOMAS R. SULLIVAN & ADAM HAMM, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE 
COMMISSIONERS, SUITABILITY IN ANNUITY TRANSACTIONS MODEL REGULATION (2010), 
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_a_suitability 
_reg_guidance.pdf; see also Carl B. Wilkerson, When Worlds Collide:  Securities Regulation 
and Equity Product Distribution by Life Insurance Companies, 26 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. 
L.J. 497, 513 (1991). 
 164. Comptroller of the Currency Banking Circular 277,  1993 Fed Banking L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 58,717, at 36,462 (Oct. 27, 1993); Comptroller of the Currency Bulle-
tin 94–31, 1994 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 58,717, at 36,473 (May 10, 1994); see 
also Hu, supra note 23, at 2339. 
 165. Compare Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed. 
Reg. 44742 (Sept. 6, 1977) (proposing several suitability standards), with Adoption of 
Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31887 (July 24, 1978) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 1, 166) (declining to adopt a proposed suitability rule, ostensibly on the theory 
that suitability is covered by anti-fraud provisions). 
 166. See e.g., Root, supra note 70, at 321–27 (discussing the judicial imposition of 
fiduciary duties, including the obligation to make suitable recommendations, in 
commodities cases notwithstanding lack of CFTC guidance). 
 167. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1329; Jane E. Willis, Banks and Mu-
tual Funds:  A Functional Approach to Reform, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 221, 252 (1995). 
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through the traditional bank supervisory process for outstanding 
loans, derivative contracts on a firm’s balance sheet, or in inspection 
sweeps focusing on particular account classifications.  For this reason, 
a number of commentators have suggested that suitability require-
ments should be imposed, often through a self-regulatory process, in 
the context of other financial markets, such as mortgage finance.168  
Suitability obligations pose a number of problems.  First, the obli-
gation of due diligence in assessing a customer’s status and objectives 
assumes that customers are entirely forthcoming about their financial 
situation.  Firms that act as financial planners or advisers to individual 
customers might have such holistic information about a client’s ob-
jectives, but for customers whose finances are spread out over various 
financial professionals, financial services providers can easily argue 
that they should not be held responsible for the performance of the 
entire portfolio.169  If one accepts the premise that any nonfraudulent 
investment transaction can, in proper proportions to the rest of an 
investor’s portfolio, represent a proper balance of risk and return,170 
it is difficult to hold firms liable for aggressive recommendations that 
go sour under a theory of suitability. 
This poses particular problems in the case of institutional investors, 
which are naturally reluctant to disclose their financial dealings with 
other firms.  For example, NASD member firms are exonerated from 
their suitability obligations to an institutional customer if the firm as-
sures itself of a “customer’s capability to evaluate investment risk in-
dependently” and determines that the customer will “exercis[e] in-
dependent judgment in evaluating a member’s recommendation.”171  
Nevertheless, some of the most prominent suitability cases under fed-
eral and state law have involved institutional investors seeking to  
rescind or modify transactions in various derivatives or asset-backed 
                                                          
 168. For example, Engel and McCoy suggest suitability as a tool for deterring pre-
datory lending, supra note 42, at 1319, while Macey and his co-authors make an ar-
gument that mortgage brokers who originate securities with a view to securitization 
are subject to 10b-5, supra note 20, at 807. 
 169. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Beyond Precedent:  Arbitral Extensions 
of Securities Law, 57 BUS. LAW. 999, 1008–13 (2002) (suggesting that an arbitration 
panel may “have stretched or reached beyond existing legal authorities” in finding a 
brokerage firm liable to a customer who was “an experienced and knowledgeable 
businessman and stock and options investor [who] devoted a substantial amount of 
his time to investments in the securities markets and maintained brokerage accounts 
with several brokerage houses.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
 170. But see Stephen B. Cohen, Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 
1604, 1634 (1971) (suggesting that no investment is unsuitable if a portfolio is prop-
erly balanced). 
 171. NASD Rule IM-2310-3, FINRA Manual (CCH) at 17,158. 
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securities on the ground that they did not possess the information or 
sophistication necessary to understand the risks they had assumed.172 
Second, as an industry standard of care, it is difficult to develop  
objective standards of conduct for the amount of risk a customer can 
undertake for purposes of determining liability or comparative fault.  
Certainly, if a customer cannot take advantage of the unique features 
of an investment transaction (e.g., tax benefits) because of his status, 
an argument can be made that a more generic transaction might 
have been appropriate.  Presumably, statutes and rules that govern 
deceptive practices can police transactions that are designed to fail or 
generate excessive fees.  But in cases where the product is arguably 
suitable for some investors, objectively scaling the transaction to a 
particular investor’s income, net worth, or investment portfolio is  
inherently arbitrary.173  
Private litigation over violations of an industry code of conduct may 
also create significant uncertainty for both financial services providers 
and their clients.  Because SRO rules or regulatory requirements are 
generally not actionable in themselves, private rights of action are 
typically rooted either in breach of a common law duty of care or, in 
the context of securities law, breach of an implied representation that 
brokers will conduct themselves in accordance with industry norms.174  
                                                          
 172. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997); 
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1289–90 (S.D. Ohio 
1996); In re BT Sec. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7124, Exchange Act Release 
No. 35136, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,477, at 86,109 (Dec. 22, 1994); see Poser, 
supra note 31, at 1497 (collecting cases where large institutions and governmental 
entities have sued under the suitability doctrine). 
 173. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan Co., NO. 07-4373-BLS1, 
2008 WL 517279 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008).  In Fremont, the court held that any 
mortgage loan (including loans that were not “high cost mortgage loans” under the 
Predatory Home Loan Practices Act) secured by the borrower’s principal dwelling 
should be presumed to be structurally unfair “within the penumbra of [the Act’s] 
concept of unfairness” if it possessed four characteristics:  The loan is an ARM with 
an introductory period of three years or less; the loan has an introductory or “teaser” 
rate for the initial period that is at least 3 percent lower than the fully indexed rate; 
the borrower has a debt-to-income ratio that would have exceeded 50 percent if the 
lender’s underwriters had measured the debt, not by the debt due under the teaser 
rate, but by the debt due under the fully indexed rate; and the loan-to-value ratio is 
100 percent or the loan carries a substantial prepayment penalty or a prepayment 
penalty that extends beyond the introductory period.  Id. at 9.  In response to the ar-
gument that such conduct was not generally recognized to be unfair at the time the 
loans were made, the Court observed that the meaning of unfairness “is forever 
evolving, not only to adapt to changing social, economic, and technological circums-
tances, but also to reflect what we have learned to be unfair from our experience as a 
commonwealth” and that Fremont had more than fair warning of the dangers posed 
by the loans bearing the four characteristics identified above.  Id. at 12–13. 
 174. See, e.g., GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“Although arguably there is no right of action simply for a violation of NASD rules, . 
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Reliance on the antifraud provisions of securities law thus gives rise to 
the same burdens of proof (e.g., state of mind) and affirmative de-
fenses (e.g., duty to read, sophistication) that frustrate private liti-
gants in the context of affirmative misstatements or misleading  
omissions.175 
In the securities context, the availability of mandatory arbitration 
of disputes under the auspices of self-regulatory bodies creates fur-
ther uncertainty, for good or for ill.176  While commentary on the ef-
fectiveness of arbitral fora in securities disputes has been mixed,177 it 
is arguable that arbitral fora comprised of industry and public repre-
sentatives might be better suited to resolving customer disputes in an 
equitable manner than judicial or administrative fora.  Arbitrators are 
not required to issue opinions and there is limited opportunity for 
judicial review;178 in contrast, judicial procedures, which are bound by 
precedent, are subject to appeal, and may entail comparatively more 
expense.179  Both policymakers and academic commentators have  
advocated the creation of self-regulatory bodies to promulgate busi-
ness conduct rules and, in some cases, arbitral fora for sellers of in-
vestment advisory, mortgage,180 and insurance181 services.  
III. THEORETICAL CHALLENGES TO A FIDUCIARY STANDARD 
Crises of confidence in the financial system instinctively translate 
into a desire to ratchet up the duties of financial services providers.182  
                                                          
. . violations may be considered relevant for purposes of § 10(b) unsuitability claims.” 
(citation omitted)); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(concluding that “there is no implied right of action for an NASD rule violation”); see 
also 9 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4440-4443 (3d ed. 2004). 
 175. Langevoort, supra note 61, at 677 (explaining the concept of a customer’s 
right to rely); id. at 681 (noting judicial imposition of a duty to read). 
 176. The Dodd-Frank Act gives the SEC the authority to prohibit or regulate 
“agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal 
securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Fed-
eral securities laws” or SRO rules.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (to be codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §78o). 
 177. See generally Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. 
REV. 1174 (2010) (examining the history and criticism of arbitration in arguing that 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements should not be banned by Congress). 
 178. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 156, at 1584, 1594 (noting that ninety-five 
percent of “errors and omissions” claims under brokerage firms’ insurance policies 
are suitability claims). 
 179. Black & Gross, supra note 62, at 1013. 
 180. Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1337. 
 181. Scott A. Sinder, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and State Regulation of the Business of 
Insurance—Past, Present and . . . Future?, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 49, 85 (2001). 
 182. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic:  Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of 
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 423–24 (2006); Joseph A. Grundfest, Punc-
tuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
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To the extent that financial intermediaries are sometimes required to 
observe fiduciary duties (e.g., when holding funds or engaging in dis-
cretionary trading), it is only natural to assume that such duties may 
be extended more broadly to all to financial intermediaries at mar-
ginal additional cost.  Further, to the extent that conflicts of interest 
can result in harm to the client, it is a natural impulse to invoke tradi-
tional fiduciary duties of a trustee or agent in an effort to discipline 
financial intermediaries.  
 Yet, as Justice Frankfurter aptly remarked, imposing the doctrine 
“only begins the analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry.”183  The 
business model that broker-dealers and other financial services  
providers employ is not well equipped to deal with the full range of 
obligations a true fiduciary duty would entail.  For example, invest-
ment advisers are subject to significant statutory restrictions when act-
ing as a principal or dual agent in transactions effected for clients 
and have a duty to avoid other conflicts of interest when managing 
discretionary accounts.184  Because broker-dealers may often partici-
pate as principals in transactions with customers, their fiduciary duty 
to nondiscretionary accounts has traditionally been limited to the 
faithful execution of customer transactions and the “handling” of 
customer accounts.185  Likewise, because broker-dealers have tradi-
tionally been compensated for transactions rather than accounts, 
broker-dealer regulation has evolved to address abuses of such 
“transaction-based compensation,” such as churning of accounts and 
excessive markups.  
                                                          
FIN. 1, 1 (2002) (describing the evolution of securities law as “punctuated” by capital 
market events spurring regulation). 
 183. SEC v. Chenery Corp, 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943).  
 184. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (prohibiting certain transactions between an 
investment adviser as principal and its customer “without disclosing to such client in 
writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting 
and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction”); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(3)-
2 (requiring written consent “prospectively authorizing” agency-cross transactions 
and a “written confirmation at or before the completion of each such transaction” 
describing the nature of the transaction); Opinion of Director of Trading and Ex-
change Division, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 40, 11 Fed. Reg. 10997 (Feb. 5, 
1945) (“In my opinion the requirements of written disclosure and of consent con-
tained in [section 206(3) of the Advisers Act] must be satisfied before the comple-
tion of each separate transaction.  A blanket disclosure and consent in a general 
agreement between investment adviser and client would not suffice.”). 
 185. De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302–03 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
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Applying the label “fiduciary” more broadly may thus be an exer-
cise in appearances rather than substance.186  To the extent that  
financial intermediaries not otherwise responsible for discretionary 
decision-making have a duty of care, those obligations typically have 
been limited to, and are difficult to extend beyond, the traditional 
diligence into the character of the transaction and the financial situa-
tion and needs of the client.  To the extent that it is consistent with 
the duty of loyalty to establish procedures to sanitize conflicts, the 
question arises whether courts or regulators are better suited to dic-
tating what procedures are sufficient and what remedies are appro-
priate for the failure to observe.  Establishing more permanent in-
formation barriers or an ongoing duty to advise could significantly 
ratchet up the costs of financial services.  Each of these arguments is 
considered in turn. 
A. Professionalism and Care 
A duty of care pervades many aspects of a financial services provid-
er’s relationship with the customer, such as the execution of transac-
tions, the custody of customer funds and securities, recordkeeping 
and reporting, and forwarding proxy materials and other important 
notices affecting the customer’s portfolio.  In addition, regulators 
prescribe examinations and qualifications as a condition of registra-
tion of such professionals and impose recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements to ensure that duties are fulfilled; malfeasance or non-
feasance with respect to any of the foregoing often results in some 
sanction.187  The concept of a duty of care when making investment 
recommendations is not only implied (if not explicitly stated) in the 
fiduciary duty investment advisers owe to their clients under the In-
vestment Advisers Act,188 but is also implicit in various mandates for 
broker-dealers under the Securities Act189 and the corresponding re-
quirements for secondary transactions developed through SEC en-
                                                          
 186. Cunningham, supra note 98, at 1492 (arguing that if it is “infeasible to estab-
lish a principles-based system of corporate law, securities regulation, or accounting, 
then it is misleading to promote the possibility”). 
 187. Even here, one may argue that such standards are designed for the protec-
tion of the financial and reputational interests of the financial services industry, ra-
ther than customers.  Unlike malpractice liability for legal and medical professionals, 
the failure to comply with industry custom rarely gives rise to liability by financial ser-
vices providers to retail clients or counterparties. 
 188. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 
(1963). 
 189. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b)–(c), 77l(a)(2) (2006).  
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forcement actions,190 the FINRA suitability rule,191 and the OCC ap-
propriateness policy.192 
However, beyond the mere performance of due diligence into a se-
curity and into the customer’s financial condition and needs, it is un-
clear how regulators should articulate any additional obligation that a 
“fiduciary” duty of care requires.193  As one commentator has noted, 
the fundamental concern with brokerage sales practices is the pros-
pect of unduly risky or unnecessarily costly transactions.194  If courts 
or regulators are permitted to make hindsight judgments as to rela-
tive risk and available alternatives, the cost of providing investment 
advice could increase dramatically,195 with a particular impact on 
smaller firms that may not be able to pass on such costs to clients.196  
If, on the other hand, investment recommendations are simply “pro-
fessional judgments” to which courts must defer, the  duty of care 
would appear to be satisfied as long as a documentary record of dili-
gence can be produced.197  Although regulators have developed ex-
press quantitative guidelines in certain narrow contexts—e.g., the 5% 
guide for “excessive” markups under the NASD’s markup policy198 or 
                                                          
 190. See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 191. NASD Rule 2310, FINRA Manual (CCH) 17,155 (2009), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=
3638. 
 192. See supra note 164. 
 193. Professor Ribstein argues that the duty of care of a professional should be 
distinguished from “fiduciary” duty, which focuses on relinquishment of gain for ser-
vices rendered. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties 9 (Ill. Program in Law, Be-
havior & Soc. Sci., Research Paper No. 10-20, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=1737948. 
 194. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 444–45. 
 195. In a study sponsored by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Associ-
ation (SIFMA), the Oliver Wyman Group estimated that fee-based accounts under 
the Investment Advisers Act are twenty-three to thirty-seven basis points more expen-
sive than retail commission-based accounts and further determined that shifting bro-
kerage customers to a fee-based advisory model would increase costs across the range 
of investors.  OLIVER WYMAN GROUP, STANDARD OF CARE:   
HARMONIZATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR SEC 4, 23–31 (2010), available at 
www.sifma.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21999 [hereinafter OLIVER 
WYMAN STUDY]. 
 196. In its Staff Report, the SEC staff noted that, as of December 2010, fifty-three 
percent of FINRA broker-dealers employed less than ten registered representatives, 
twenty-nine percent employed ten to fifty employees, nine percent employed fifty-
one to 150 employees, and nine percent employed over 150 employees. SEC REPORT, 
supra note 24, at 11–12. 
 197. Ramirez, supra note 67, at 550. 
 198. NASD IM-2440-1 (adopting a “5% Policy” on markups while stressing that the 
policy is a “guide, not a rule” and that lesser markups may be “considered unfair or 
unreasonable”); NASD IM-2440-2 (stating that markups must be determined based 
on “prevailing market price” as determined by the dealer’s “contemporaneous cost” 
or “contemporaneous proceeds”). 
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statutory standards for “high-cost” mortgages199— courts applying qu-
alitative standards of suitability must struggle with the decision 
whether to ground their rulings in empirical evidence demonstrating 
abnormalities from industry practice.200 
Developing quantitative standards for suitability, while not infeasi-
ble,201 poses its own challenges.  Any attempt by regulators to require 
firms to classify or otherwise grade investment transactions on an ob-
jective spectrum of risk, and thereafter to sanction firms that mischa-
racterize such risk, runs the risk of being counterproductive or, at 
worst, treading upon the financial services provider’s ability or wil-
lingness to speak candidly about its perceptions of risk.  Congress and 
the SEC, for example, have generally sought to shield projections, 
opinions, or other forward-looking statements about securities from 
sanction for fear that such liability could chill the flow of information 
to potential investors.202  In the context of securities litigation, credit 
rating agencies have invoked the First Amendment with mixed suc-
cess to defend their right to publish negative ratings about corporate 
issuers.203  
                                                          
 199. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §§ 1431–33, 124 Stat. 1376, 2157, 2160–63 (2010) (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1639). 
 200.  See, e.g., Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999) (cri-
ticizing the district court’s finding that a markup on a Treasury security was not “ex-
cessive” because it was “indisputably at the extreme low end of what the SEC consid-
ers to be acceptable” and because there was “no authority for his contention that ‘the 
standard industry spread’ for such a markup is five times less than what the defen-
dants charged” for not engaging in a “more extensive examination”); Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smoth v. Arceneaux, 767 F.2d 1498, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting 
judicial rule of thumb that an annual turnover rate in excess of six reflects excessive 
trading”).  
 201. Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification and Using Spread to 
Measure Risk, 54 BUS. LAW. 1599, 1626 (1999) (advocating use of the bid/ask spread 
as a quantitative measure of risk for purposes of determining whether an otherwise 
adequately diversified portfolio recommended to an investor poses unsuitably exces-
sive risk). 
 202. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (2006) (creating a safe harbor for forward-
looking statements); 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2010). 
 203. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 
175 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“It is well-established that under typical circumstances, the First 
Amendment protects rating agencies, subject to an ‘actual malice’ exception, from 
liability arising out of their issuance of ratings and reports because their ratings are 
considered matters of public concern.” (citation omitted)); In re Enron Corp. Sec., 
Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 817 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[W]hile 
there is no automatic, blanket, absolute First Amendment protection for reports 
from the credit rating agencies based on their status as credit rating agencies, the 
courts generally have shielded them from liability for allegedly negligent ratings for 
various reasons.”); see also Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs., Inc., 499 
F.3d 520, 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the dismissal of claims against rating 
agencies brought on the basis of credit ratings by invoking the protections of the 
First Amendment).  
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B. Inherent Conflicts in Principal Trading 
Perhaps the most controversial of the conflicts of interest to which 
financial services providers are subject is proprietary trading.  The 
underwriting and market-making activities of securities and commod-
ity broker-dealers by their nature entail a conflict of interest, to the 
extent that many securities or derivatives contracts are sold out of or 
purchased for inventory, whether by the firm itself, an affiliate, or a 
third party pursuant to a contractual or other arrangement.  Retail 
investors who subscribe for IPO securities or who purchase municipal 
securities and corporate debt from dealer inventory almost invariably 
deal directly with a dealer acting as principal.204  In the context of in-
vestment advisory activity, however, Congress and the SEC have sub-
jected such conflicts to fairly extensive disclosure and consent re-
quirements to mitigate the “dumping” of securities into the accounts 
of managed funds or discretionary accounts.205 
Another approach would be to segregate marketing or advisory ac-
tivities from other functions, such as underwriting, dealing, market 
making, structuring new products, and proprietary trading.  By eli-
minating conflicts, regulation would preclude misalignment of the 
incentives of sales representatives with their clients’ financial inter-
ests; as a result, firms would be encouraged to compete based on cus-
tomer service, rather than the ability to push transactions to custom-
ers that benefit the firm financially.  Prohibiting affiliations between 
public customer business and other financial services might further 
improve the diligence of employees of financial services firms.206  The 
use of independent agents, such as insurance agents,207 mortgage 
brokers, accountants, and occasionally lawyers, is common in many 
financial transactions; such agents in theory possess the freedom to 
build relationships with several financial services providers with a view 
to steering their clients to the products that offer them the best value.  
                                                          
 204. The Oliver Wyman Study notes, for example, that municipal and corporate 
debt securities are largely sold out of dealer inventory and that a ban on principal 
trading would cut customers off from a range of products.  OLIVER WYMAN STUDY,  
supra note 195, at 15–21. 
 205. Laby, supra note 20, at 408. 
 206. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 621, 124 Stat. 1376, 1631–32 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
77a) (prohibiting underwriters, placement agents, initial purchasers, or sponsors of 
an asset-backed security from engaging “in any transaction that would involve or re-
sult in any material conflict of interest with respect to any investor in a transaction 
arising out of such activity” for a period of one year, except in connection with risk-
mitigation activities or market-making or liquidity commitments). 
 207. Wilkerson, supra note 163, at 526. 
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Such strategies have not been successful for a number of reasons.  
Segregating the brokerage function (acting as an agent for custom-
ers) from the dealing function (buying and selling for one’s account) 
would require customers to pay two intermediaries for the simple ex-
ecution of a stock transaction; independent research and financial 
advice would add costs that could be prohibitive for individual inves-
tors.208  More generally, financial services providers might argue 
(however strenuous the opposition)209 that they can reduce the cost of 
searching for and effecting transactions in investment products for 
their clients if they offer substantially equivalent products in house.210  
Firms may also possess privileged information and access with respect 
to offerings of securities in connection with their underwriting activi-
ties that (to the extent legally permissible) may be used to benefit 
their clients.211  
Moreover, an absolute prohibition against such affiliations is rare 
because they may be beneficial to customers.212  Financial services 
firms have developed a dense web of quid-pro-quo arrangements, 
such as marketing fees or payments for order flow, that create similar 
opportunities to internalize costs and similar conflicts of interest.213  
Market makers, dealers, and event-registered stock and options ex-
changes maintain payment-for-order-flow relationships with execut-
                                                          
 208. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 449; cf. Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell 
Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39, 49, 67–80 (2007) (arguing that retail investors, 
unlike institutions, cannot afford to buy research, and thus rely on sell-side analysis 
subsidized by underwriting/market making activities). 
 209.  See Black, supra note 78, at 87–88 (summarizing criticisms of and litigation 
against brokers recommending proprietary mutual funds that carry high costs with-
out disclosing the availability of comparable mutual funds at significantly lower 
costs).  
 210. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty:  Sole Interest or Best 
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 973–76 (2005) (describing the success of the financial ser-
vices industry in persuading the Department of Labor and state legislatures to permit 
fiduciaries to invest beneficiaries’ assets in affiliated mutual funds despite the evident 
conflict of interest). 
 211. Fisch, supra note 208, at 64; Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, Do Analyst Con-
flicts Matter?  Evidence from Stock Recommendations, 51 J.L. & ECON. 503, 531 (2008) 
(concluding that “while analysts do respond to IB and brokerage conflicts by inflat-
ing their stock recommendations, the market discounts these recommendations after 
taking analysts’ conflicts into account”).  But see In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 
465 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39–40 (D. Mass. 2006) (describing the conflict of interest be-
tween CSFB’s investment banking and research departments that allegedly compro-
mised the quality of CSFB’s analyst reports); Regulation Analyst Certification, 33–
8193, 68 Fed. Reg. 9482, 9482 (Feb. 27, 2003) (final release) (describing the purpose 
of Regulation AC, 17 C.F.R. § 242.500 et seq.). 
 212. H.R. REP. NO. 106-434 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the purpose of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is “to enhance competition in the financial services industry 
by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, in-
surance companies, and other financial service providers, and for other purposes”). 
 213. Fisch, supra note 126, at 2008; Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off To-
day?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 303, 328 (2008). 
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ing brokers, even though the SEC has suggested that they may com-
promise the quality of trade executions.214  Mutual funds pay market-
ing fees to broker-dealers and other financial services purveyors, in 
addition to fees for execution, custodial, and other services, which 
may create conflicts of interest.215  Sponsors of securitization vehicles 
necessarily pay mortgage brokers and mortgage originators for pro-
viding them with a stream of underlying assets.216  While regulators 
may adopt rules banning or regulating the fees provided in such rela-
tionships (e.g., when they encourage placement of customers into 
transactions with burdensome terms),217 or requiring greater transpa-
rency of such fees,218 firms can constantly create innovative new ways 
to funnel money to business partners. 
Assuming that such relationships cannot (or should not) be un-
done, what meaningful results could additional regulation of con-
flicts of interest under a fiduciary standard produce?  As discussed be-
low, the law of agency typically requires the fiduciary to obtain the 
consent of the client in good faith after disclosure of all material facts 
about the transaction and the conflict of interest.  For investment ad-
visers with discretionary trading authority, there is a requirement to 
provide disclosure and obtain consent transaction by transaction;219 
                                                          
 214. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34902, 59 Fed. Reg. 
55006 (Nov. 2, 1994) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (approving final rules for  
payment for order flow practices). 
 215. See, e.g., Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distri-
bution, Investment Company Act Release No. 26591, 69 Fed. Reg. 54728, 54730 
(Sept. 9, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) (amending Rule 12b-1 under the In-
vestment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1, to prohibit evasion of the rules  
governing 12b-1 marketing fees through directed brokerage). 
 216. 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d), (e); Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58512 
(Sept. 24, 2010) (describing purpose of rule as “protecting consumers in the mort-
gage market from unfair practices involving compensation paid to loan originators” 
by “prohibit[ing] a creditor or any other person from paying, directly or indirectly, 
compensation to a mortgage broker or any other loan originator that is based on a 
mortgage transaction’s terms or conditions, except the amount of credit extended”); 
see also David Streitfeld, Fed Adopts Rules Meant to Help Protect Home Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 17, 2010, at B3 (describing the Federal Reserve’s proposal to adopt new rules 
“banning yield spread premiums, which allowed mortgage brokers and lenders to 
gain additional profit from loans by charging borrowers higher-than-market interest 
rates”).  
 217. See supra note 19 (describing Dodd-Frank Act § 1403). 
 218. See Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58512 (Aug. 16, 2010) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (amending Regulation Z to restrict compensation to loan origina-
tors that encouraged them to steer borrowers to loans that carried higher-than-
market interest rates); supra note 218 (payment for order flow); supra note 215 (Rule 
12b-1 fees). 
 219. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2006) (requiring disclosure of principal trades “to such 
client in writing before the completion of such transaction . . . and obtaining the 
consent of the client”); Opinion of Director of Trading and Exchange Division, In-
vestment Advisers Act Release No. 8, 11 Fed. Reg. 10997 (Feb. 5, 1945) (“In my opi-
DOMBALAGIAN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2011  4:17 PM 
2011] THE ESSENCE OF DUTY 1309 
whereas, for the typical nondiscretionary account, the financial ser-
vices provider lacks the authority to consummate the transaction 
without consent, but all conflicts are not currently disclosed.  Accor-
dingly, in both cases, the benefit of imposing a fiduciary duty on bro-
kers, advisers, bankers, or other financial services provider will rest 
primarily on the ability to improve the manner in which disclosure is 
provided and the manner in which the client’s consent is secured. 
The fact that the securities industry has expressed little discomfort 
with the application of a fiduciary duty that can be satisfied through 
good-faith disclosure and consent220 suggests that any disclosures re-
quired by SEC rulemaking under Section 913 are likely to impose lit-
tle burden on their business model.221  The SEC has already tipped 
their reluctance to require transaction-by-transaction consent for fi-
nancial services provides broadly, in light of its position against ex-
tending the rules governing principal and agency cross trades under 
the Investment Advisers Act to broker-dealers.222  Disclosure of how 
the various components of the financial services industry operate and 
interrelate would be too “voluminous” to be of help in any specific 
transaction.223  Such disclosures are unlikely to provide the investor, 
phrased as they are with descriptions of a range of possible con-
flicts,224 with either a quantitative indication of probability or the like-
lihood that a financial services provider’s incentives to profit from 
                                                          
nion the requirements of written disclosure and of consent contained in this clause 
must be satisfied before the completion of each separate transaction.  A blanket dis-
closure and consent in a general agreement between investment adviser and client 
would not suffice.”). 
 220.   Industry Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform 
Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 110–13 (July 
17, 2009) (statement of Randolph C. Snook, Executive Vice President, Securities In-
dustry and Financial Markets Association). 
 221. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 120 (concluding, with a lack of helpful specific-
ity, that “[t]he Commission should address through guidance and/or rulemaking 
how broker-dealers should fulfill the uniform fiduciary standard when engaging in 
principal trading”). 
 222. See Investment Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)-1:  Certain Broker-Dealers, 
17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-1 (2010).  The original Rule, as proposed, was vacated by 
the D.C. Circuit in Financial Planning Assoc. v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 
2007).  See infra Part III.C for further discussion. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(1)(C) (requiring the confirmation pro-
vided to the customer to contain “a statement whether payment for order flow is re-
ceived by the broker or dealer for transactions in such securities and the fact that the 
source and nature of the compensation received in connection with the particular 
transaction will be furnished upon written request of the customer”) with 17 C.F.R.  
§ 242.606(a)(1)(iii) (requiring broker-dealers to “make publicly available” in a quar-
terly report order routing information that includes, inter alia, “[a] discussion of the 
material aspects of the broker’s or dealer’s relationship with each venue identified 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, including a description of any  
arrangement for payment for order flow and any profit-sharing relationship”).  
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one line of business (dealing) at the expense of another (client ser-
vices) will be altered by the volume of transactions or the opportunity 
for profit.  In addition, any such granularly detailed disclosures would 
not necessarily provide any guidance as to whether a specific recom-
mendation is, or is not, made in good faith. 
C. Ongoing Obligations to Advise 
The asymmetry in the perceived duration of investment transac-
tions may also account for some of the tension in applying fiduciary 
duties to firms that arrange or execute investment transactions.  From 
the perspective of the financial services provider, its obligations 
should end the moment the transaction is completed.  If a firm is 
compensated on the basis of completing individual transactions, and 
yet is responsible for such transactions for their expected duration 
(which in the case of stocks or mutual funds, could be indefinite), the 
exponentially increasing burden of monitoring prior transactions 
(both with respect to the performance of the asset and the continu-
ing suitability for the investor) is unaffordable.  From the firm’s pers-
pective, an ongoing duty would be implied only if there was an op-
portunity to collect ongoing compensation (e.g., a wrap fee or 
mortgage service fee). 
On the other hand, from the customer’s perspective, the financial 
services provider’s performance is often judged based on the long-
term performance of the transaction, particularly if the customer in-
curs ongoing costs to maintain the investment.  Because of the signif-
icant interval between the time that the transaction is consummated 
and the gains or losses of the transaction are realized, customers may 
view the transaction as involving a relational contract with ongoing 
obligations on the part of the financial services provider.  To the ex-
tent that financial services providers create the impression of such a 
relationship, whether through the mandatory provision of financial 
statements and other disclosures or through the recommendation or 
execution of additional transactions, it is understandably difficult for 
the customer to appreciate the unwillingness of financial services 
providers to accept responsibility for continued performance.  
The boundary between recommending securities transactions at a 
given point in time and providing investment advice over a period of 
time has grown hazy as a result of the transformation of compensa-
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tion models in the securities industry over the past several decades.225  
Compensation for investment advice has traditionally been structured 
as a fixed fee or percentage of assets under management as an incen-
tive to maximize the value of the investors’ portfolios.  Brokers, on 
the other hand, have traditionally received compensation in the form 
of a per-transaction commission, while dealers have received com-
pensation in the form of a “mark-up” on the price of securities sold to 
a customer from (or a “mark-down” on the price of securities bought 
from a customer for) their inventory.226 
As fee competition among broker-dealers and other discount bro-
kers intensified, brokerage firms experimented with “wrap fees” for a 
full complement of brokerage, research, and advisory services based 
on assets under management rather than transaction volume and 
“discount brokerage” fees for self-directed customer accounts.227  This 
collision in business models contributed in no small part to the SEC 
rulemaking vacated in Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC.228  In that case, 
financial planners and investor advocacy groups successfully chal-
lenged a Commission rule permitting brokerage firms to offer asset-
based fee structures to non-discretionary brokerage accounts.229 While 
                                                          
 225. As a result, in enacting the Advisers Act, Congress sought to distinguish bro-
kerage activity from investment advisory activity based on compensation structure:  
section 202(a)(11) of the Act provides that the term “investment adviser” includes 
“any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as 
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities,” but subsequently excludes in clause (C) “any broker or dealer whose per-
formance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a bro-
ker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor.”  15 U.S.C.  
§ 80b-2(a)(11)(C).  As traditionally interpreted by the Commission, broker-dealers 
were not deemed to receive “special compensation” for incidental investment advice 
if their compensation consisted solely of the traditional commission received for the 
execution of securities transactions.  See Opinion of the General Counsel relating to 
section 202(a)(11)(C) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 2, 11 Fed. Reg. 10996 (Sept. 27, 1946). 
 226. Integrated firms that offer both brokerage and dealer services may act as 
both broker and dealer with respect to a customer transaction and accordingly re-
ceive both forms of compensation. 
 227. Laby, supra note 67, at 406, 415. 
 228. 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating the exclusion from the definition of 
investment adviser for “[c]ertain broker-dealers” in 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-1); 
Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 20424 
(Apr. 19, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).  In vacating the Commission’s rule, 
the majority opinion focused largely on the question whether the Commission could 
use its authority under subsection (F) to exclude any “additional” class of broker-
dealer not excluded under subsection (C).  Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 487.  The 
majority observed, inter alia, that the Commission had reversed “six decades of con-
sistent SEC understanding” in interpreting subsection (F) in this manner, id. at 490, 
and that the Commission’s power to “prescribe different requirements for different 
classes of persons or matters” did not give it the power to defy the will of Congress, 
id. at 490. 
 229. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 483.  Exclusions were subject, inter alia, to 
greater disclosure about the differences between brokerage and investment advisory 
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from the Commission’s perspective the development of wrap fees was 
salutary to the extent that it eliminated incentives for brokers to en-
gage in aggressive sales practices, the convergence in compensation 
models continues to create confusion about what “full service”  
brokerage customers are paying for.   
One can question the utility of a fiduciary duty to the extent that 
that it confuses, rather than clarifies, this asymmetry of expectations.  
The Dodd-Frank Act, for example purports not to impose on broker-
dealers “a continuing duty of care or loyalty to the customer after 
providing personalized investment advice.”230  If ongoing asset-based 
wrap fees in “full-service” nondiscretionary brokerage accounts signif-
icantly exceed the discount commissions paid by “self-directed”  
accounts on individual transactions, however, “full-service” customers 
may believe they are paying premium compensation for some ongo-
ing advisory service, even if account documentation suggests other-
wise.  Such a system of rules would appear to entrench, rather than 
address, the disconnect between the expected and actual benefits of a 
fiduciary duty. 
D. Availability of Private Relief 
Finally, extending the proposed “fiduciary” label to broker-dealers 
or other financial services providers may well ring hollow to the ex-
tent that no private right of action exists for clients injured by “per-
sonalized investment advice.”  Advisory clients currently cannot sue 
their investment advisers for damages resulting from breach of the 
duties enumerated in Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, ab-
sent the showing of reliance on a material misstatement or mislead-
ing omission made with scienter as required by Rule 10b-5.231  Moreo-
ver, nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act suggests that private remedies for 
breaches of any fiduciary duty created under section 913 are availa-
ble, and commentators have speculated that the SEC is unlikely to 
endorse such a range of remedies.232  
                                                          
accounts and exclusions for financial planning and discretionary accounts.  17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.202(a)(11)-1 (2010). 
 230. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
 231. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 
(1979) (discerning no private right of action for damages under section 206 of the 
Investment Advisers Act, while acknowledging “the availability of a suit for rescission 
or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract”). 
 232. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 455. 
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The purpose of a broad fiduciary duty appears to be to give public 
authorities significant flexibility to develop causes of action based on 
novel legal theories, particularly in cases where an intent to deceive 
may be difficult to establish because no affirmative misstatement is 
made to investors about the role being played by the putative fidu-
ciary in the same or comparable transactions.233  But public enforce-
ment officials can assert greater flexibility in applying securities law to 
the sales practices of financial intermediaries without necessarily labe-
ling such duties as “fiduciary.”  For example, courts have applied the 
more liberal standard of securities fraud in New York’s Martin Act234 
and section 17(a) of the Securities Act—neither of which creates a 
private right of action—to reach conduct that would otherwise not be 
actionable under Rule 10b-5, based on a liberal reading of the com-
mon law distinctions between fraud and deceit.235 
IV. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO A FIDUCIARY STANDARD 
In addition to the theoretical problem of extending fiduciary  
duties beyond traditional relationships of trust and investment, 
adopting a fiduciary standard any subset of financial services provid-
ers could pose a number of practical challenges.  Any attempt to ex-
tend fiduciary duties beyond the realm of securities business—e.g., to 
mortgage transactions—would be anathema to banks and bank regu-
lators alike and would compromise efforts to harmonize sales practice 
standards for all investment transactions.  Regulators would invariably 
come under pressure to adopt safe harbors to give financial services 
providers greater certainty with respect to routine transactions.  
There is also a risk that courts and regulators might simply apply  
increasingly commercialized versions of a fiduciary duty to reflect the 
realities of modern financial services, and thus undermine the appli-
                                                          
 233. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963) 
(holding that scienter is not required to establish that a practice “operates as a fraud 
or deceit upon any client or prospective client” within the meaning of section 206 of 
the Investment Advisers Act). 
 234. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1996) (granting the Attorney General 
exclusive authority to bring actions under Martin Act). 
 235. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (holding that the SEC need not show 
scienter to establish that a person was engaged “in a transaction, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit” under sec-
tion 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act); In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 
823 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding no private right of action under sec-
tion 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933).  The Martin Act has generally been inter-
preted to preclude actions under state common law for misrepresentation and 
breach of fiduciary duty in connection with transactions “within or from” New York 
in the absence of a showing of scienter.  Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Min-
metals Int’l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162–65 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
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cation of fiduciary duties in those areas (e.g., investment advisory ser-
vices and discretionary trading) where they are needed most. 
A. Regulatory Competition and Inconsistent Enforcement 
The most significant complication in calibrating the obligations of 
financial services providers to their clients is the opportunity for regu-
latory arbitrage create by our fragmented system of financial services 
regulation.  The differences in sales practice regulation across regu-
lated entities constitute some of the significant remaining obstacles to 
harmonizing financial services regulation within the United States.236  
As commercial and investment banks and other financial services 
providers have increasingly branched into overlapping lines of busi-
ness, Congress and federal regulators have only made modest efforts 
to standardize business conduct rules—primarily, ministerial “back-
office” practices, such as notifications of privacy policies, money 
laundering, telemarketing, sharing of information among affiliates, 
and identity theft.237  While the financial crisis has prompted Congress 
to consider uniform measures of capital adequacy and to harmonize 
resolution protocols for financial services firms,238 sales practice regu-
lation for U.S. financial services providers has thus far escaped efforts 
at harmonization.239   
Such disharmony has traditionally been explained by the historical 
differences in core products offered by regulated entities; for exam-
ple, as discussed above, there may be less need to regulate the con-
                                                          
 236. Helen A. Garten, The Consumerization of Financial Regulation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 
287, 315–16 (1999) (arguing that retail consumer protection is the remaining area of 
financial regulation that faces regulatory competition problems). 
 237. See, e.g., David A. DeMuro, et al., Basics of Broker-Dealer Supervision, Outline, 
1748 PLI/Corp 129, 141 (2009). 
 238. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454–55 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384) 
(granting the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation the authority to effect an or-
derly liquidation of “covered financial companies,” including both bank holding 
companies and nonbank financial companies, such as investment banks). 
 239. In other countries, regulatory authority over banking, insurance, securities 
and other financial products has been consolidated into a single regulator. See, e.g., 
Eilís Ferran, Examining the United Kingdom’s Experience in Adopting the Single Financial 
Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 257, 273–76 (2003) (describing the process by 
which the U.K. Financial Services Authority assumed the role of single regulator for 
the regulation of banks, securities markets, and insurance companies); Joseph Silvia, 
Efficiency and Effectiveness in Securities Regulation:  Comparative Analysis of the United 
States’s Competitive Regulatory Structure and the United Kingdom’s Single-Regulator Model, 6 
DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 247, 258–63 (2008) (comparing the costs and benefits of 
the U.K. single regulator model and the U.S. multiple regulator model).  See also 
TREASURY, BLUEPRINT, supra note 30, 170–80 (proposing a single “Conduct of Busi-
ness Regulatory Agency” for all financial services, including banking, lending, insur-
ance, futures and securities). 
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duct of purveyors of traditional banking products, such as deposits 
and mortgages, through sales practice regulation when bank examin-
ers’ focus on safety and soundness precludes the creation of highly 
dangerous products.240  Conversely, the high risks undertaken by un-
derwriters, market makers, and other securities dealers may have his-
torically counseled in favor of more rigorous business conduct regu-
lation of securities representatives.241  As financial services providers 
may now provide a multitude of services in the name of affiliated 
companies, such distinctions are anachronistic. 
Indeed, the greater threat presently seems to be confusion as to the 
level of service that clients receive from their financial services pro-
viders.  Recent studies have suggested that customers do not appre-
ciate the difference between an investment adviser and a broker-
dealer sales representative that provides incidental investment ad-
vice,242 that certain products sold by bank employees carry FDIC in-
surance while others do not,243 and that variable annuities marketed 
by insurance agents are largely interchangeable with traditional mu-
tual funds.244  Other differences are more subtle:  Derivatives embed-
ded in mortgages245 or non-financial services—such as the differences 
between floating and fixed energy bills or other commodities—are 
not regulated as separate financial products, even though customers 
                                                          
 240. See supra notes 68 (discussing credit rationing as a tool for protecting lenders 
against imperfect information about default risk under the Stiglitz-Weiss model) and 
164 (discussing the OCC’s appropriateness policy for derivatives transactions by  
national banks). 
 241. Karmel, supra note 31, at 1275 (discussing the difficulty of finding broker-
dealers to be fiduciaries in light of their role as agents or principals). 
 242. ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND INSTIT. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, INVESTOR & INDUS. 
PERSPECTIVES ON INV. ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS xix (2008), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR556.pdf (finding that 
“[i]nvestors had difficulty distinguishing among industry professionals and perceiv-
ing the web of relationships among service providers”).  It is not clear that even regu-
latory personnel are able to manage such fine distinctions.  Scandals involving Ma-
doff Investment Securities, the Stanford Financial Group, and other Ponzi schemes 
that have recently unraveled have revived doubts over the murky demarcation among 
brokerage, dealing and advisory services.  FINRA SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT 
OF THE 2009 SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT 
OF THE STANFORD AND MADOFF SCHEME 65–72 (September 2009) (discussing FINRA’s 
jurisdictional and historical limitations on the examination of investment advisers 
and other financial services providers affiliated with FINRA member firms), available 
at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/documents/ 
corporate/p120078.pdf; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE 
SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 16–18 (2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf. 
 243. Helen A. Garten, The Consumerization of Financial Regulation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 
287, 295–96 (1999); Sinder, supra note 181, at 59 n.53. 
 244. Markham, supra note 111, at 793. 
 245. Macey et al., supra note 20, at 810 (arguing that mortgages are equivalent to 
an annuity written by the borrower to the lender while reserving an option to prepay 
or put the property to the lender). 
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face the same asymmetries of information, sophistication, and ability 
to bear risk when selecting from among such products. 
Commentators have developed a variety of theories to explain the 
obstacles to harmonizing differences in sales practice regulation.  
Those sympathetic to the SEC’s efforts to bolster sales practice regu-
lation frequently invoke regulatory capture to explain the tension be-
tween the SEC and the banking agencies.246  Others cast the tension 
in terms of institutional competence, preservation of regulatory turf, 
or simply differences in culture.247  While Congress has expanded the 
activities in which regulated financial services providers may engage, 
it largely has abdicated any role in determining the regulatory juris-
diction of the regulated.248  
The courts, meanwhile, have expressed over time a preference for 
technical construction of obsolescent statutory text in lieu of develop-
ing principles to match regulatory jurisdiction to the merits of partic-
ular financial products.249  In American Bankers Ass’n v. SEC,250 the D.C. 
Circuit blocked an attempt by the SEC to address the boundaries be-
tween brokerage activity subject to Commission regulation and the 
authority of banking regulators over entities chartered as federal or 
state banks.251  The Commission’s Rule 3b-9 would have subjected to 
Commission regulation any bank that earned “transaction-related 
compensation” from brokerage services, whether as an accommoda-
tion for existing banking customers or resulting from public solicita-
tion.252  
                                                          
 246. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION:  THE SECURITIES & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 310–313 (1982); Linda B. Mata-
rese, Should the SEC Regulate Banks as Broker-Dealers?, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 145, 169, 
171 n.181 (1988) (discussing differences between regulation of the securities busi-
ness by bank regulators and the SEC in the areas of advertising, sales practices, SIPC 
coverage, among others). 
 247. See, e.g.,  John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of 
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. LAW. 447, 450–51 
(1995) (describing role of the House Agriculture Committee in protecting CFTC's 
jurisdiction). 
 248. See infra text accompanying notes 261–264. 
 249. Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process:  The Revi-
sionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987). 
 250. 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 251. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the regulation 
of “nationally chartered banks,” which are chartered under 12 U.S.C. § 21.  The 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System supervises bank holding compa-
nies and state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System; the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation supervises state-chartered banks not subject 
to the Board’s supervision. 
 252. Notwithstanding the exclusion of banks from the statutory definitions of 
“broker” and “dealer” in the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)–(5), the Commis-
sion predicated its authority to exclude banks engaged in for-profit brokerage servic-
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Noting that Congress was aware of the various securities-related ac-
tivities in which banks had traditionally engaged,253 the court noted 
that the term “bank” was “defin[ed] . . . in terms of the government 
agencies that regulated them,” rather than the specific functions they 
performed (i.e., deposit-taking)254 and that the exclusion of banks 
from registration as brokers and dealers was thus “but one part of a 
consistent congressional policy of keeping oversight of the banking 
system separate from the SEC’s oversight of the securities trading and 
investment industries.”255  The Court notably refused to consider 
whether Congress would have granted the SEC the power to regulate 
the brokerage activities of banks had it anticipated that bank regula-
tors might interpret Glass-Steagall to permit banks to engage in retail 
bank brokerage activity.  
In the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Congress clarified that 
banks may engage in securities-related activities, subject to the re-
quirement to “push out” activities other than certain enumerated ac-
tivities that constituted traditional banking activity into a subsidiary 
subject to Commission regulation.256  The trouble is that Congress has 
left it to the federal agencies to squabble among themselves as to the 
appropriate allocation of regulation through a variety of legislative 
gimmicks.257  Joint rulemaking exercises,258 consultation require-
                                                          
es from the scope of the statutory definition based on (i) the statutory qualification 
that Congress’ definitions were open to reinterpretation if “the context otherwise 
requires,” § 78c(a), and (ii) the Commission’s power “to define technical, trade, ac-
counting, and other terms used in [the Exchange Act], consistently with [its] provi-
sions and purposes,”  § 78c(b). 
 253. These included investment advising, agency brokerage, custodial and trans-
mittal services.  See Am. Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(quoting the testimony of William Potter, Chairman, Guaranty Trust Co.).  Many of 
these services may continue to be offered by banks without registration as a broker or 
dealer.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (listing exclusions from the definition of “bro-
ker” and “dealer” for certain bank activities). 
 254. Am. Bankers Ass’n, 804 F.2d at 747. 
 255. Id. 
 256. 15 U.S.C. § 78c3(a)(4)(b)(i); S. Rep. No. 106-44, 9–10 (1999) (discussing the 
history of bank securities activities and the justifications for requiring some, but not 
all, securities activities of banks to be conducted through an SEC-regulated broker-
dealer affiliate). 
 257. For example, while Congress initially granted the Commission the authority 
to determine the scope of activities that would trigger broker-dealer registration un-
der the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, it subsequently mandated joint rulemaking between 
the SEC and bank regulators after the SEC published a proposing release containing 
rules to which the banking community objected. Compare Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 201-02, 113 Stat. 1338, 1385–91 (1999) (amending the defini-
tions of “broker” and “dealer” in sections 3(a)(4)-(5) of the Exchange Act), with Fi-
nancial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, 120 Stat. 1966, 
1968 (amending section 3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act by adding a joint rulemaking 
requirement for implementing exceptions to the definition of “broker” under subpa-
ragraph (B)). 
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ments,259 dual registration of financial intermediaries260 and “jump 
ball” provisions giving regulators the right to challenge one another’s 
turf in federal court261 have become troublingly commonplace in the 
regulation of business practices in the financial community.  To the 
extent that Congress is unable to articulate a coherent vision of how 
regulatory authority should be functionally allocated, it is up to the 
SEC, the CFTC, federal and state banks, and insurance and consumer 
protection regulators to find ways to harmonize their respective regu-
latory frameworks. 
B. Safe Harbors for Compliance 
Another challenge to extending fiduciary or professional obliga-
tions to financial services providers is the need to define categories of 
products or transactions that fulfill the provider’s fiduciary duty with-
out further action.  Safe harbors are routinely developed to guide fi-
duciaries in structuring transactions or making decisions on behalf of 
a principal in a manner that minimizes the risk of challenge and sub-
sequent judicial review.  Unlike regulations that prohibit unfair or 
                                                          
 258. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(D) (requiring joint SEC-CFTC rulemaking to es-
tablish rules for classifying foreign indices as “narrow-based securities indices” for 
purposes of allocating jurisdiction over related index futures and index options); 
§ 78g(c)(2)(B) (providing for joint SEC-CFTC rulemaking pursuant to delegated 
authority from the Federal Reserve Board regarding margin requirements for securi-
ty futures products). 
 259. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 712(a)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. 1641, 1641–42 (2010) (to be codified at  
15 U.S.C. § 8302) (requiring the CFTC to consult and coordinate with the SEC, and 
vice versa, before “commencing any rulemaking or issuing an order regarding swaps, 
swap dealers, major swap participants”); id. § 712(a)(7), at 1642 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 8302) (requiring such rules to “treat functionally or economically similar 
products or entities . . . in a similar manner”); id. § 712(d)(3), at 1645 (to be codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 8302) (requiring the Financial Stability Oversight Council to resolve 
any dispute between the SEC and CFTC regarding such rulemaking). 
 260. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6f(a)(1), 15(b)(11) (requiring dual registration of brokers 
and dealers that trade security futures products).  Compare 7 U.S.C. § 7b-1 (2006) 
(setting forth requirements for securities exchanges required to register as contract 
markets), with 15 U.S.C. § 78f(g) (requiring a designated contract market trading 
securities futures to register as a securities exchange). 
 261. See 7 U.S.C. § 27d (granting the Federal Reserve Board a similar right of con-
sultation and challenge with respect to any CFTC rule regulating a hybrid instrument 
that the CFTC has determined not to be predominantly a banking product); 
15 U.S.C. § 78o(i) (granting the Federal Reserve Board a right of consultation and a 
right to challenge before the D.C. Circuit any SEC rule imposing broker or dealer 
registration requirements with respect to any new hybrid product, based on whether 
imposing such a requirement “is appropriate in light of the history, purpose, and ex-
tent of regulation under the Federal securities laws and under the Federal banking 
laws, giving deference neither to the views of the Commission nor the Board”); 
Dodd-Frank Act § 712(c), 124 Stat. at 1643–44 (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 8302) 
(permitting either Commission to petition for judicial review of the other’s rulemak-
ing). 
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deceptive practices or limit investment to certain approved prod-
ucts,262 the purpose of the exercise is to put investors on notice that 
certain products may pose greater risk or greater complexity than 
more “plain vanilla” products.   
In specific contexts, the financial intermediary’s duty of loyalty is 
exhaustively defined by statute and regulation.  ERISA, for example, 
prohibits transactions between a private plan and a fiduciary or trans-
actions between a private plan and any “party in interest” caused by a 
fiduciary unless effected pursuant to a specific exemption,263 with the 
understanding that the associated regulators (the Secretaries of  
Labor and the Treasury) would exercise exemptive authority to pro-
vide guidance to persons providing brokerage or management servic-
es.264  In some cases, such statutes are expressly designed to displace 
open-ended fiduciary duties or duties of disclosure, whereas in oth-
ers, courts may be inclined to infer displacement to provide definitive 
guidance to financial services providers.265 
An example of such a regulatory safe harbor in the Dodd-Frank Act 
is the classification and treatment of certain “qualified mortgages.”  
To the extent that mortgage originators are subject to a professional 
                                                          
 262. Root, supra note 70, at 353 (describing evolution from “legal lists” to modern 
portfolio theory).  The Dodd-Frank Act creates a process by which any person that 
proposes to list or trade a “novel derivative product” may seek a determination from 
the SEC and the CFTC (subject to judicial review) as to whether such product is a 
“security” or “contract for future delivery,” “commodity option” or “option on a con-
tract for future delivery,” but gives the agencies no special authority to regulate such 
products.  Dodd-Frank Act § 718, 124 Stat. at 1652–54 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 8306).  
 263. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (prohibiting a fiduciary with respect to an ERISA plan from 
entering into certain transactions with the plan or causing the plan to enter into cer-
tain transactions with a “party in interest”); HARVEY E. BINES & STEVE THEL, 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LAW AND REGULATION, § 2.04{b}{1], at 64–65 (2d ed. 2004) 
(stating the “general principle” that “unless expressly exempted, any transaction (1) 
with an employee benefit plan by a fiduciary for its own account, or (2) between a 
plan and a party in interest . . . or a disqualified person . . . caused by a fiduciary is 
prohibited”). 
 264. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (providing the Secretary of Labor with the authority to 
grant exemptions “if administratively feasible, in the interests of the plan and of its 
participants and beneficiaries, and protective of the rights of participants and bene-
ficiaries of such plan”); H.R. Rep 1280, 93d Cong. 309–310 (1974); see also BINES & 
THEL, supra note 270, § 11.02[B][1], at 740.  For example, the Department of Labor 
has promulgated a “prohibited transaction exemption” for “qualified plan asset 
managers” that are deemed “independent of the parties in interest and which meet 
specified financial standards.”  Class Exemption for Plan Asset Transaction Deter-
mined by Independent Qualified Professional Asset Managers 84-14, 49 Fed. Reg. 
9494 (March 13, 1984), as amended in 70 Fed. Reg. 43905 (Aug. 23, 2005). 
 265. Cf. Press v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 218 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (determin-
ing compliance with Rule 10b-10 requirement regarding disclosure of third party 
remuneration was sufficient to avoid liability for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5).  
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or fiduciary “duty of care” in originating mortgages,266 the Act creates 
a presumption that a consumer has the “ability to pay” a mortgage 
that meets certain statutory criteria and standards implemented by 
regulation related to the loan’s duration and amortization schedule, 
the ratio of monthly debt to monthly income resulting from the loan, 
the ratio of total points and fees to the size of the loan, and the 
spread between the loan’s interest rate and the average prime offer 
rate.267  Such rules create an incentive for mortgage originators to 
conform to the terms dictated by the statute and implement regula-
tions to avoid subsequent challenge under the statute’s duty of care 
and the attendant penalties.268 
Such approaches are not without their flaws.  First, to the extent 
that sales practice rules should provide some protection to institu-
tional or sophisticated investors, regulatory guidelines are not easily 
extensible to such transactions; some residual fiduciary or profession-
al duty would therefore be necessary to address complex transactions.  
Second, such approaches presuppose that regulators are able to es-
tablish and maintain guidelines on an ongoing basis for suitable and 
unsuitable investment transactions.  For example, only in 2008, did 
Congress and the Department of Labor permit managers of defined 
contribution plans to invest unallocated employee contributions to a 
default option other than money market mutual funds,269 on the 
theory that the Department did not want to create a safe harbor pro-
tecting fiduciaries from litigation in the event of a decline in value.270 
                                                          
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 6–19 (describing the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
imposition of such duties). 
 267. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1422, 124 Stat. 1376, 2157 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638a). 
 268. Id. § 1404, at 2141 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b) (extending liability 
under section 130 of the Truth in Lending Act to mortgage originators in breach of 
such duties for the greater of actual damages or an amount equal to three times the 
total amount of compensation or gain accruing to the mortgage originator, plus 
costs and attorneys’ fees); id. § 1413, at 2148–49 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 1640(k)) (providing that a consumer may assert a violation of such duties as a mat-
ter of defense by recoupment or set off in the face of a judicial foreclosure at any 
time notwithstanding the statute of limitations under section 130 of the Truth in 
Lending Act). 
 269. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (protecting such a fiduciary from liability “for any 
loss. . . that is the direct and necessary result of . . . investing all or part of a partici-
pant’s or beneficiary’s account in any qualified default investment alternative,” as  
defined in the rule); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(5), as amended by section 624 of the 
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. 
 270. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 131 (2008) (noting the Department of Labor’s “re-
luctance . . . to issue guidelines officially blessing (by granting a “safe harbor” status) 
any fund that could ever decline in value”). 
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Third, they create a perception that certain investments are gov-
ernment-sanctioned, which creates political pressure for protecting 
such investments through fiscal or monetary policy, particularly when 
there are significant inducements for the certifying body to grant 
more favorable treatment.  For example, the favorable treatment as-
signed to certain mortgage-backed securities under capital adequacy 
rules encouraged financial services providers, pension funds, and so-
vereign wealth funds to concentrate holdings.  This overconcentra-
tion, and subsequent collapse of the market when defaults started 
mounting, triggered unprecedented intervention by the Federal Re-
serve to stabilize prices indefinitely.271 
From the perspective of firms, such approaches pose a risk of stifl-
ing innovation to the extent that deviations from favored products 
can give rise to significant liability.  Professor Jill Fisch has addressed 
this problem by proposing a rule that would provide financial innova-
tors with a safe harbor from the imposition of fiduciary remedies if, 
among other things, such innovators either offer transactions that 
“conform” to regulatory guidelines or “explain” material deviations 
therefrom.272  The protective effect of such disclosures, however, is 
unclear for either investors or financial services providers.  To the ex-
tent that such safe harbors, by implication, deal with novel terms, re-
viewing courts may well focus on the subjective intent of the offeror 
rather than the objective materiality of the deviations—this, in turn, 
would impair investors’ ability to challenge the suitability of novel 
products. 
C. The Trend to Commercialize Fiduciary Duties 
A third complication with imposing fiduciary duties on all invest-
ment recommendations is that it would invariably lead legislatures 
and courts to “commercialize” fiduciary obligations, either through 
codification of fiduciary obligations or by developing legal presump-
tions or defenses that neutralize prima facie claims.  Fiduciary duties 
of loyalty and care, like all standards applied ex post facto in adminis-
trative or judicial proceedings, in theory would shift the burden onto 
financial services providers, individually and collectively, to develop 
norms of conduct to be tested in enforcement proceedings and pri-
                                                          
 271. Expressing concern over the possibility of such “moral hazard,” Congress 
commissioned a study of the feasibility of creating an SRO or similar public or pri-
vate entity to assign NRSROs to determine credit ratings.  Id. § 939F(b)(2)(C), at 
1889 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9). 
 272. Fisch, supra note 213, at 103, 117, 118 (explaining that a safe harbor from 
fiduciary duties or antifraud rules exists only if there is adequate disclosure of non-
conforming features of a particular product). 
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vate litigation, and to make adequate provision for the legal risks re-
sulting from any foray into novel services.273  Fiduciary standards, 
however, may be so open-ended, particularly if sanctions or remedies 
are sought well after the offending conduct has occurred, that their 
application by courts or arbitrators might well appear highly arbitrary 
from the perspective of both firms and their clients.274  
To the extent that fiduciary duties may be limited or eliminated by 
agreement,275 judicial forbearance is all that is required to blunt their 
impact.276  SIFMA’s endorsement of fiduciary duties, as long as the 
impact of such duties can be rendered “business-model neutral” 
through disclosure and waiver of conflicts,277 reflects this trend.  In 
private placements and over-the-counter offerings, firms have long 
sought to negotiate “no reliance” clauses, “big boy letters,” and simi-
lar clauses disaffirming any duty of care or reliance on the firm’s ad-
vice for purposes of federal securities law and state agency law.278  Of 
course, commentators argue that fiduciary duties should continue to 
play an “extracontractual” role to prevent abusive contracting,279 or at 
                                                          
 273. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 961–968 (1995) 
(contrasting, inter alia, the strengths and weaknesses of rules, standards, and prin-
ciples as sources of law); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 
42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621–24 (1992) (contrasting the ex ante costs of developing rules 
with the ex post costs of applying and enforcing standards) 
 274. Lowenfelds & Bromberg, supra note 155, at 1584 (noting that the securities 
industry’s concern with respect to unsuitability claims “has been exacerbated within 
the last decade,” among other factors, by the shift of private actions from the courts 
to arbitration tribunals and “a concomitant shift in the legal basis for unsuitability 
claims from an interpretation and application of rules promulgated by the SEC  
under the federal securities laws to an interpretation and application of the suitabili-
ty rules promulgated by the SROs”); Karmel, supra note 31, at 1293–97 (noting that 
“arbitration is a business forum, not a court of law, and arbitrators need not follow 
legal precedent”); Black, supra note 79, at 103 (“Whatever its imperfections, the 
FINRA arbitration forum presents a great advantage from the investors’ perspective: 
its emphasis on equity allows arbitrators to fashion a remedy for investors that may 
not be supported by the law.”). 
 275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006). 
 276. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense:  Fiduciary Standards 
and Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2743, 2749 (2006) (discussing the 
drawbacks of and Uniform Trust Code limits placed on waivers for skill and con-
flicts). 
 277. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 113. 
 278. The SEC’s general counsel has taken the position that attempts to disclaim 
liability for ordinary negligence may be void and may further be fraudulent, to the 
extent that such liability cannot be waived under federal securities law.  See, e.g.,  
Interpretive Releases Relating to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and General Rules 
and Regulations Thereunder, 16 Fed. Reg. 3387 (Apr. 18, 1951) (opining that such 
clauses may be void under section 215(a) and violative of sections 206(1) and 206(2) 
of the Investment Advisers Act). 
 279. Ramirez, supra note 68, at 563. 
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least a suppletive role when conflicts of interest cannot be adequately 
defined or addressed by contract.280  
In other contexts, courts have taken the initiative in fashioning 
doctrines that relieve fiduciaries of the more onerous aspects of the 
duty of loyalty and care when it might otherwise impair the efficiency 
of the fiduciary’s performance.  Whereas the law of asset manage-
ment once imposed very detailed prescriptions for investment deci-
sion making under the prudent man rule, courts and legislators have 
significantly liberalized the parameters within which asset managers 
exercise their duty of care.281  In the context of corporate law, the du-
ty of care has been rendered largely a procedural rule, rather than a 
substantive rule, in order to free directors to take calculated risks.282  
At the same time, courts have carved out safe harbors from prohibi-
tions against self-dealing, dual agency, or other conflicts of interest to 
accommodate financial services providers operating in multiple ca-
pacities as long as they act in an objectively “fair” manner.283  
This term’s decision in Jones v. Harris Associates284 is perhaps the 
most recent illustration of judicial attitudes with respect to fiduciary 
duties in the context of financial services.  The fiduciary duty at issue 
in Harris Associates was created by Congress in Section 36(b) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, which creates a private right of ac-
tion against the investment adviser of a registered company for 
breach of “fiduciary” duty in connection with the adviser’s compensa-
tion.285  The statutory language was meant to serve as a compromise 
                                                          
 280. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 
(1995). 
 281. See, e.g., BINES & THEL, supra note 270. § 8.02, at 365–98 (tracing the evolution 
of prudent-investor jurisprudence in both case law and statutory law from the Second 
Restatement of Trusts to the Third Restatement). 
 282.  See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (“As for 
the plaintiffs' contention that the directors failed to exercise ‘substantive due care,’ 
we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts 
do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even decide if 
they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decision-making context is 
process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.”). 
 283. Leslie, supra note 283, at 2713.  For example, legislators in most states have 
permitted trustees to purchase proprietary mutual funds for trusts. Id. at 2733 & 
n.68.  Trustees can avoid “further inquiry” of beneficial owners by engaging in “fair” 
transactions with principal.  Id. at 2721.  But see John H. Langbein, Questioning the 
Trust Law Duty of Loyalty:  Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 931 (2005) 
(defending “no further inquiry” rule). 
 284. 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). 
 285. More specifically, section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
deems investment advisers of mutual funds registered as an investment company “to 
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of 
payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by 
the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of 
such investment adviser.”  15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).  Section 36(b) further allows 
DOMBALAGIAN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2011  4:17 PM 
1324 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1265 
 
between traditional corporate law remedies for excessive compensa-
tion—which requires shareholders of a mutual fund to show that the 
directors had committed waste in agreeing to an excessive compensa-
tion arrangement with the investment adviser—and granting the SEC 
the authority to set “reasonable” compensation for mutual fund ad-
visers through some sort of ratemaking process.286  
The prevailing test for reviewing investment adviser compensation 
under Section 36(b) was articulated by the Second Circuit in Garten-
berg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.287  In that case, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the test for excessive compensation is “essen-
tially whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range 
of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in the light of all 
of the surrounding circumstances,” and more specifically, whether 
the fee charged is “so disproportionately large that it bears no rea-
sonable relationship to the services rendered.”288  Among the “perti-
nent facts” a reviewing court was required to weigh in making this de-
termination were “the adviser-manager’s cost in providing the 
service,” the adviser’s ability to realize “economies of scale as the fund 
grows larger,” and “the volume of orders which must be processed by 
the manager.”289 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Harris Associates, 
the petitioner challenged, in the Court of Appeals below, the diffe-
rential fee structure Harris Associates applied to its “captive” retail and 
institutional mutual funds and other independently managed funds.  
The Seventh Circuit, departing from the reasoning in Gartenberg, 
viewed the fiduciary requirement in section 36(b) as little more than 
a requirement to disclose conflicts of interest.  In its view, competi-
tion among mutual funds, based on full disclosure of compensation 
arrangements, was sufficient incentive for fund managers and in-
vestment advisers to avoid “excessive” fees; fund advisers, under the 
Seventh Circuit’s logic, should be permitted to negotiate at “arm’s 
length” for differential compensation for different levels of research.  
                                                          
shareholders in such funds to bring a suit against the investment adviser in the right 
of the mutual fund “for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or 
payments.”  Id.  
 286. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 16 (1969) (noting the Senate Committee’s belief that a 
private action for breach of fiduciary duty “provides an effective method whereby the 
courts can determine whether there has been a breach of this duty by the adviser or 
by certain other persons with respect to their compensation from the fund” and fa-
voring “industry self-regulation” over “recommending that the Congress set a maxi-
mum statutory commission rate for mutual fund sales loads”). 
 287. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 288. Id. at 928.  
 289. Id. at 930. 
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In the wake of the Seventh Circuit’s decision, some commentators 
made even more aggressive assertions about adviser compensation—
for example, suggesting that an investment adviser who consistently 
generates abnormally high returns should be entitled to keep a signif-
icant percentage of those returns in the form of higher advisory fees 
to the same extent as private equity and hedge fund managers share 
in the returns they generate for their clients.290 
In interpreting section 36(b), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
reasoning in Gartenberg with a view to upholding the fiduciary concept 
without engaging in ratemaking or reflexively relying on market 
competition.  In particular, the Court focused on the need to “take 
into account both procedure and substance” when assessing whether 
the fee comported with the investment adviser’s fiduciary duty.291  
Noting that Congress had already stiffened the requirements for the 
independence of mutual fund directors vis-à-vis the advisory fund, it 
rejected judicial “second-guessing” of “informed board decisions.”292  
Thus, “[w]here a board’s process for negotiating and reviewing in-
vestment-adviser compensation is robust, a reviewing court should af-
ford commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining 
process.”293  Conversely, “where the board’s process was deficient or 
the adviser withheld important information, the court must take a 
more rigorous look at the outcome.” 294 
The Supreme Court thus recognized that the law can, in relevant 
ways, shift the burden to financial services providers to develop subs-
tantive and procedural safeguards when setting the terms of their re-
lationship with their clients.  But its decision reinforces the percep-
tion that fiduciary duties, in the context of financial services, are 
fundamentally duties of process and candor, with substantive scrutiny 
of particular transactions only in rare cases when those requirements 
are not met.  Extending an open-ended fiduciary duty to financial 
services providers who make investment recommendations may ulti-
mately accomplish little more than backstop existing internal con-
trols and mandatory disclosures required by financial regulators or 
self-regulatory bodies.  Even forceful advocates of raising sales prac-
                                                          
 290. Johnsen, supra note 75, at 590 (arguing that if a fund generates abnormal re-
turns, it is not inappropriate for manager to charge higher fees). 
 291. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. at 1429. 
 292.  Id. at 1430. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Coffee Testimony, supra note 56, at 19–20; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 551(2)(a); Langevoort, supra note 62, at 688.  
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tice standards have conceded that such standards must be articulated 
in a manner that avoids imposing quantitative guidelines.295 
V. CAPTURING THE ESSENCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
This article argues that there is a case for applying certain disclo-
sures of a fiduciary nature consistently across all financial services 
providers, as long as compliance can clearly be defined ex ante and 
customers clearly understand the contours, if not the precise limits, 
of their financial services provider’s duties.  The essence of fiduciary 
duty when making investment recommendations, as described above, 
should be good faith disclosure of both qualitative and quantitative 
information about the financial services provider’s basis for making a 
recommendation, as well as any conflicts of interest affecting the  
financial services provider’s judgment, coupled with a requirement to 
make the customer whole if the customer suffers a loss proximately 
caused by the breach of such duties.  
Accordingly, this article speculates that such a fiduciary duty would 
be manageable if financial services providers could qualify for a safe 
harbor by providing their clients with certain quantitative informa-
tion in good faith about their proprietary assessment of the risk of the 
transaction.  Specifically, the mandatory offer of a put option “mar-
ried” to investment transactions, or offer of a comparable hedging 
transaction, can function more effectively than a fiduciary “put” at 
communicating risks, sanitizing conflicts, and shaping client expecta-
tions.  Several scholars have explored the use of “revealing options” 
or “self-assessment” as a means to encourage or compel parties to 
communicate information about their valuation of entitlements or 
tort damages,296 or as a means of valuing the right to sue, for example, 
for claims of expropriation.297 
                                                          
 295. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1342 (advocating a suitability stan-
dard for mortgage products, but conceding that could devolve into price regulation 
if not adequately articulated).  See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consum-
er Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 941(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1890–96 (to be codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9) (requiring federal banking agencies, the SEC, the Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development, and the Director of the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency to jointly define the term “qualified residential mortgage,” for  
purposes of the Act’s credit risk retention requirement, by reference to “underwrit-
ing and product features that historical loan performance data indicate result in a 
lower risk of default,” including the mortgagor’s residual income after the payment 
of all monthly obligations and the ratio of both monthly mortgage payments and to-
tal monthly installment payments to the mortgagor’s monthly income). 
 296. Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1434 (2005) 
(arguing that the use of “entitlements subject to self-made options” in lieu of liability 
rules as a means of allowing entitlement holders in “name-your-own liability” regime 
will enhance “entitlement holder's autonomy”); Ian Ayres, Protecting Property With 
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This approach would also complement regulatory efforts to sup-
plement, or in some cases substitute, qualitative guidance with quan-
titative or empirical information about market risk.298  Recent scholar-
ship has explored the possibility of that institutional investors might 
find it useful to rely on credit default swap spreads, in lieu of or in 
addition to investment grade ratings, for regulatory and risk-
management purposes;299 these initiatives follow on the coattails of 
the SEC’s own efforts to eliminate regulatory reliance on investment 
grade ratings.300  Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act has championed 
greater disclosure about the specific assets underlying asset-backed 
securities.  This proposal takes these initiatives one step further by 
requiring firms to disclose, in discrete quantities, their proprietary  
assessment of the markets they offer customers. 
A. The Proposal 
Consider the following requirement:  When recommending an in-
vestment transaction,301 a financial services provider enjoys a safe har-
                                                          
Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 803 (1998) (arguing for the use of “puts” as a means of 
protecting victims of nuisance because, inter alia, “put options share the same core 
advantage of traditional liability rules: they harness the private information of the 
option holder”); Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 
VA. L. REV. 771, 771, 779 (1982) (building on the notion that “the individual who is 
most familiar with a property right is also likely to be the party best able to put a 
monetary value on that interest” in order to develop mechanisms for owners to pub-
licly communicate proprietary information about—and thus for courts to more pre-
dictably determine—the value of property, tort damages, and difficult-to-value 
shares). 
 297. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications for Eminent 
Domain, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 416–21 (2009) (arguing that the right to bring 
a lawsuit can be valued using real options theory for purposes of determining “just 
compensation” when the government seeks to condemn a prospective plaintiff’s 
right to bring a lawsuit against a third party); see also Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to 
Sue: An Option-pricing Approach, 19 J LEGAL STUD. 173, 174 (1990) (“Filing a suit is ana-
logous to purchasing an option, because it gives the plaintiff the right to proceed to-
ward trial without having the obligation to try the case.”). 
 298.  See, e.g., Booth, supra note 205, at 1626. 
 299. See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery et al., Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes 
for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2113–14 (finding support for the conclu-
sion that “CDS spreads reflect information more quickly and accurately than credit 
ratings”) (2010). 
 300. See also Dodd-Frank Act § 939(a)–(e), 124 Stat. at 1885–86 (to be codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 1817) (replacing references to ratings and related terms, such as “in-
vestment grade,” in various statutes governing financial institutions with delegation 
of authority to individual agencies to develop “standards of credit-worthiness”); id. 
§ 939A, at 1887 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 78o-7) (requiring federal agencies to 
review and, as necessary, modify any regulations that require assessments of credit-
worthiness or refer to or require reliance on credit ratings). 
 301. I propose to define “recommendation” to refer to communications by a fi-
nancial services provider reasonably intended to solicit a specific transaction, as used 
in FINRA’s suitability rule.  See NASD Rule 2310, FINRA Manual (CCH) 17,155 
(2009). This definition would exclude, for example, general advice about financial 
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bor from liability based on a breach of the duty of care or a conflict 
of interest if it offers its customers in good faith a “put” or “collar” 
giving the customer the ability to rescind the transaction at an arbi-
trary percentage of the initial investment amount (e.g., eighty per-
cent) within an arbitrary period (e.g., one year) after each debit of 
customer funds (e.g., payment of the purchase price, payment of in-
terest and principal on a loan, or posting of additional margin in a 
securities or commodities account).302  Analogous rules could be ex-
tended to annuities and other insurance products, as well as mort-
gages—for example, lenders could be required to offer and price the 
right to “put” an underlying property to the lender via a non-recourse 
mortgage. 
On the one hand, customers who elect to purchase the additional 
protection would forgo the “fiduciary put” they would enjoy under 
law—i.e., the ability to rescind a transaction within the statutory limi-
tations period for all or part of the purchase price if they can demon-
strate a breach of fiduciary duty in a judicial or arbitral proceeding—
with an option that has clearly defined price and time parameters.  
From both the perspective of the financial services provider and the 
customer, the good faith offer and purchase of such an option elimi-
nates the indeterminacy of fiduciary duty.  On the other hand, if the 
customer chooses not to purchase the option, the mere fact of mak-
ing such an offer in good faith would reveal significant information 
                                                          
planning, allocation of assets, and other transactions not involving specific financial 
products.  Id.  It would also not apply to situations in which a member acts “solely as 
an order-taker for persons who, on their own initiative, effect transactions without a 
recommendation from the member.”  NASD Notice to Members 96–60, Clarification 
of Members’ Suitability Responsibilities Under NASD Rules on Member Activities in 
Speculative and Low-Priced Securities (Sept. 1996), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/noties
/p016905.pdf.  As the NASD has noted, a “broad range of circumstances may cause a 
transaction to be considered recommended,” including, for example, dissemination 
of forecasts, research reports, or other communications by a financial service provid-
er designed to draw a customer’s attention to a financial product.  Id.; see Sales Prac-
tice Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, 54 Fed. Reg. 35468, 35476–77 
(Aug. 28, 1989); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 156, at 1560–61 (describing in-
dustry concerns about NASD’s suitability rule and definition of “recommendation”); 
NASD Notice to Members 96–60, supra (maintaining that it is facts-and-circumstances 
that determine whether a transaction is “recommended”); see also Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended Securities:  An Agency Theory 
of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535, 542 n.17 (2005) (discussing Internet 
broker-dealers and recommendations). 
 302. In the case of a “married put,” the required disclosures would consist of, at a 
minimum, the premium required to purchase the option; in the case of a “collar,” 
the required disclosure would consist, at a minimum, of the cap on the upside gains 
of the transaction as a condition of receiving the downside protection. 
DOMBALAGIAN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2011  4:17 PM 
2011] THE ESSENCE OF DUTY 1329 
about the financial services provider’s estimation of the risk entailed 
in entering into the transaction.  
An accurately priced “put” premium would convey to even the least 
financially literate customer some relative sense of the risk of an in-
vestment transaction—particularly when viewed in comparison to the 
premiums associated with other products.  Keeping disclosure down 
to simple numbers will facilitate efforts at improving numeracy of in-
vestors across product classes.303  Moreover, requiring that such  
options and associated price information be offered as part of the so-
licitation of the transaction would force the kind of disruption in the 
selling process that is desirable to overcome the aggressive sales pitch 
touting the virtues of a particular investment. 
B. Defining Good-Faith Information 
The key to implementing such a proposal is to ensure that the op-
tion is accurately priced, which is where the law of fiduciary duty can 
play a critical role.  Targeting the financial services provider’s fidu-
ciary duty on the narrow question of providing an accurate price for 
the option would eliminate much of the qualitative second-guessing 
of an investment recommendation.  Instead, it would focus any ex 
post facto inquiry on the accuracy of the price-setting process and the 
adequacy of internal controls designed to capture all relevant infor-
mation within the firm’s possession that should influence that 
process.  In particular, requiring firms to use a consistent price across 
all customer transactions that is derived from a consistent proprietary 
methodology creates a record that regulatory or self-regulatory  
authorities can easily audit to ensure that customers are treated fairly. 
For products that have an externally derived reference price (e.g., 
publicly traded options on securities, commodity futures, interest rate 
futures), quoting an option at the public price—or even offering to 
purchase a corresponding option on such a market—would suffice.  
For many financial services providers, this would create an incentive 
to offer customers highly standardized products that can easily be 
hedged rather than to tack on additional features that may generate 
additional fees but increase rescission risk. 
To the extent that there are no perfect hedges, self-regulatory bo-
dies might be charged, in the first instance, with identifying which 
listed contracts are suitable for hedging particular investment trans-
actions in accordance with the procedures currently used, such as set-
                                                          
 303. See Fanto, supra note 22, at 111 (arguing that agencies should require cus-
tomer disclosure to match educational initiatives). 
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ting margin requirements for options and futures strategies.  For 
nonfungible underlying assets, such as real property, self-regulatory 
bodies might permit regional indices, if available, to substitute for 
loan-level information.  Regulators might also exclude certain prod-
ucts whose risk of default is minimal, or at least ascertainable using 
commonly available information—such as certain government securi-
ties and FDIC-insured certificates of deposit.  Likewise, where the fi-
nancial services provider itself guarantees performance of a prod-
uct—such as a covered bond, fixed income annuity, guaranteed 
investment contract, or principal-protected security issued by the fi-
nancial services provider—the firm itself should not generally be  
required to quote an option on its own solvency.304 
For other products and transactions—particularly those involving 
nonfungible underlying assets, such as real property—there is a risk 
that firms will either overprice or underprice the option.  A firm may 
have an incentive to overprice in order to discourage customers from 
purchasing such protection or to bilk unsophisticated customers by 
tacking on additional fees.  A firm may have an incentive to under-
price the option in order to downplay the risk of the transaction, if it 
can otherwise effectively discourage the customer from purchasing 
the option.  In these cases, compliance with the fiduciary duty to in-
dividual customers becomes a question of whether the firm has im-
plemented internal controls that meet regulatory standards (as af-
firmed by a regulatory or self-regulatory body) and whether the price 
generated was determined in accordance with those procedures. 
To qualify for a safe harbor from fiduciary analysis, such controls 
would likely have to ensure that option premiums either (i) reflect 
contemporaneous cost, if the firm does not engage in market making 
or proprietary trading with respect to the transaction, or (ii) reflect 
the firm’s own internal projection(s) of the expected value of the op-
tion if it does.  To say that the option must reflect contemporaneous 
cost is not to say that firms are not entitled to turn a profit:  the pro-
posal does not prohibit them from charging a commission, fee, mar-
kup, markdown, or other costs in connection with the transaction it-
self.  Such fees may take into account the administrative or other 
costs associated with the offering of such options as well.  But to the 
extent that the purpose of communicating the value of the option is 
to shield the transaction from a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, 
                                                          
 304. Michael Durrer et al., The Proposed United States Covered Bond Act of 2010, 127 
BANKING L.J. 632 (2010) (describing the operation of covered bond programs); John-
sen, supra note 75, at 565 (describing FIAs). 
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the precision of price cannot be clouded by spreads, markups, mark-
downs, or other distortive influences. 
Even more controversial, perhaps, would be the requirement that 
firms incorporate price information from their own underwriting, 
market making, and proprietary trading activities in determining the 
value of the proposed option.  From a technical standpoint, this pro-
posal presents the obvious question whether a “single” price would 
even be possible to derive, to the extent that each trader or unit with-
in a firm may employ different models.  From the investing public’s 
point of view, the choice of internal model is not necessarily as im-
portant as consistency in the use of the model by a particular finan-
cial services provider, insofar as the exercise is a comparative one.  
Moreover, to the extent that risk management in financial services 
firms of any significant size is required to use a single model, the  
appropriate universe of models can be confined to those employed in 
that department. 
More substantively, financial services providers may argue that fi-
duciary duties should not require disclosure of confidential informa-
tion regarding their proprietary trading strategies gathered in the 
course of their representation of particular issuers or clients.  Of 
course, every securities, derivative, or other financing transaction  
reveals certain information about each counterparty’s trading posi-
tions, and the proposal does not contemplate requiring public cus-
tomers to keep any such information confidential, for to do so would 
frustrate the purpose of facilitating comparison shopping.  To the ex-
tent that the proposal is designed with the goal of providing informa-
tion as concisely as possible—i.e., a snapshot of the firm’s view as to 
the expected performance of the transaction expressed as a single 
number—reverse engineering proprietary trading strategies is likely 
to be very difficult.305  Moreover, a firm would always be free to forgo 
offering the option, and thus face the risk of an ex post adjudication 
of breach of fiduciary duty. 
C. Customer Interaction 
The proposal substantially relies on the average customer’s ability 
to appreciate the importance, and limitations, of a married put or 
                                                          
 305. In this respect, the proposal is much more conservative than proposals ad-
vanced to require public disclosure of proprietary trading models for purposes of 
containing systemic risk.  Cf. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Out-
sourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. 
REV. 127, 189 (2009) (proposing an “open-source” approach to prudential regulation 
in which “that banks seeking to use internal risk models for setting their capital re-
quirements publicly disclose the details of those risk models”). 
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similar contract.  Practically speaking, it will rarely be possible or de-
sirable to claim a safe harbor from fiduciary duties when the financial 
services provider had “dominated or controlled” the customer, or 
otherwise managed the customer’s account on a de facto discretio-
nary basis.  And of course, the financial services provider will lose the 
safe harbor if it has not acted in good faith—for example, by offering 
a product that technically complies with the provisions of the safe 
harbor but is intentionally designed to evade the purposes of appli-
cable law.  
But the proposal remains subject to a behaviorist critique that pro-
viding quantitative information without context can exacerbate the 
perceived weaknesses in decisions about investment transactions.306  
Moreover, the exercise may prove largely futile in enabling customers 
to make long-term investment decisions if contracts can be structured 
to shift risk into the future.  It may be possible, however, to use the 
tools identified in the behaviorist literature to make the “optionality” 
conversation as informative as the disclosed price information itself. 
First, the safe harbor should require that information about the 
married put or similar option be communicated and updated during 
each material communication (oral or written) with the customer 
about the transaction.307  A self-regulatory organization, for example, 
could formulate the proposed communication in a number of ways, 
depending on the nature of the transaction and the need to keep the 
particular statement as concise as possible (e.g., for a simple stock 
purchase, something like “based on the revised terms, we can offer 
you the option to unwind this transaction within a year for 90% of 
your investment at a price of $X”).  Questions about the option could 
then trigger additional disclosures and references to regulatory dis-
cussions of the meaning and limitations of the information being 
communicated, in much the same way that sales representatives or 
customer service representatives used automated scripts today.308 
                                                          
 306. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 81, at 22; Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human 
Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 880 (1995) (“Similarly, a salesperson selling 
something tempting but risky, such as options or commodities, will bring a marginal-
ly plausible set of reasons why the product is a smart, responsible choice, knowing 
that investors wish to construct an explanation for the desired investment consistent 
with their positive self-concept. . . .  Investors and consumers want to think the warn-
ings are meant for someone else, not them.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 307. For these purposes, a “material communication” would be any communica-
tion in which the terms of the proposed transaction are amended or modified in a 
material way. 
308.   Martin C. Bryce, Jr. & Ballard Spahr, Credit Card Developments, 1590 PLI/CORP 
259, 275–76 (2007) (describing suit filed by Minnesota Attorney General against 
Capital One Bank and Capital One F.S.B. for use of customer service telephone 
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Regulators would also need to launch a concerted investor educa-
tion effort around the importance of understanding how such infor-
mation could be used.  At a minimum, regulators might caution in-
vestors to refrain from investing in a particular transaction, or 
“nudge” them toward particular “plain vanilla” transactions, if they do 
not understand the numbers.309  For the average investor, regulators 
could develop guidelines, similar to other consumer protection 
guidelines, that discuss a spectrum of risk and illustrate how products 
along such a risk spectrum may perform under different circums-
tances, similar to the format in which many brokerage websites pro-
vide key financial statistics and compare the performance of different 
asset classes.310  In particular, such rules of thumb can complement 
credit ratings to provide both quantitative and qualitative informa-
tion about the relative risk of securities. 
D. Risk Management  
Such a proposal is likely (as with any proposal that imposes fidu-
ciary duties on financial services providers) to increase legal or opera-
tional risk.  Firms may respond to the prospect of increased risk in a 
number of ways, such as by making more conservative recommenda-
tions or limiting their recommendations to easily hedged products, 
adopting enhanced hedging practices as part of managing their pro-
prietary risk, or simply treating such increased risk as un-hedgeable 
and thus increasing the likelihood of a firm default in the event of a 
heightened incidence of rescission (whether through the exercise of 
                                                          
scripts in connection with marketing of credit cards); Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Ko-
rosec, Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Context: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives, 
1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 393, 443–44 (2005) (describing information-gathering scripts 
used by customer service representatives in private credit-card dispute resolution). 
 309. One could argue that if the option is not comprehensible, the transaction is 
unsuitable.  See, e.g., Macey et al., supra note 20, at 815 (distinguishing transaction 
suitability from product suitability).  Alternatively, the safe harbor might not be avail-
able for certain retail accounts.  Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(4)(A)(i) (exception from 
proportionate liability provisions governing federal securities law class actions for in-
dividuals “whose recoverable damages . . . are equal to more than 10 percent of [his] 
net worth” or whose “net worth . . . is equal to less than $200,000”). 
 310. See, e.g., E*Trade Financial, Mutual Fund Screener, available at 
https://www.etrade.wallst.com/v1/fundresearch/etfscreener/etf_screener.asp;  
Fidelity.com, Mutual Fund Evaluator, http://screener.fidelity.com/ftgw/evaluator/ 
mf/goto/landing?ref_ro=0005; see also Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus De-
livery Option for Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Release 
No. 33-8998, 74 Fed. Reg. 4545, 4548 (Jan. 26, 2009) (adopting rules responding to 
“address the length and complexity of mutual fund prospectuses by streamlining the 
key information that is provided to investors, ensuring that access to the full wealth 
of information about a fund is immediately and easily accessible, and providing the 
means to present all information about a fund online in an interactive format that 
facilitates comparisons of key information, such as expenses, across different funds 
and different share classes of the same fund”). 
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puts or lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty).  Each of these options 
would naturally impose serious costs on investors, whether in the 
form of diminished investment opportunities or additional transac-
tion costs; nevertheless, the proposal reduces the costs of compliance 
and enforcement by establishing clear and auditable standards for 
compliance.  
To assess the impact of the proposal on firms, it is useful to consid-
er first how the marketplace is likely to respond to a mandate that in-
dividual firms making investment recommendations offer downside 
protection.  The proposal enables financial services providers to more 
accurately determine their legal risk when providing recommenda-
tions that otherwise would be subject to a fiduciary standard.  It also 
implicitly assumes that risks can be transferred to larger financial in-
stitutions that are better able to diversify them.  For actively traded 
products, the cost of protection can be determined ex ante from cur-
rent market prices and passed on to the customer at the point of sale.  
For products that trade in less liquid markets, in theory, firms unable 
to bear the risk of rescission could purchase wholesale portfolio in-
surance from larger firms that engage in proprietary trading (wheth-
er account by account or on an omnibus basis).  
As a practical matter, for most investment transactions, mechan-
isms would develop to manage the risk on a wholesale level.  Clearing 
firms that hold public customer accounts might offer portfolio pro-
tection to clients of introducing firms for securities transactions, since 
they already manage credit risk.311  If any class of firms would be una-
ble to meaningfully offset the risks of the proposal, it would likely be 
underwriters of equity offerings, to the extent that they would likely 
be required to assume any additional risk of rescission if their selling 
group members breached a fiduciary standard when offering under-
written products; even here, however, the risk of liability for breach 
of fiduciary duty could be limited to section 11 of the Securities Act.312 
To the extent that the proposal does impose a significant com-
pliance cost—i.e., how do wholesale firms manage their exposure to 
introducing or originating firms—the cost will therefore likely be 
shifted to wholesalers.  Regulators would seek to ensure that wholesa-
lers have adequate internal controls in place to anticipate the extent 
                                                          
 311. See generally Henry F. Minnerop, Clearing Arrangements, 58 BUS. LAW. 917, 929–
931 (2003) (describing clearing arrangements between introducing and clearing 
brokers and the role of the clearing firm in managing credit risk).  I do not intend, 
of course, to suggest that clearing firms would, as a result of providing such services, 
owe any fiduciary duty or otherwise be liable to customers of the introducing broker. 
 312. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). 
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of the risk to which their retail counterparties will expose them.  
Wholesalers in turn will negotiate with specificity what products re-
tailers will offer, the terms on which they will be offered, and so forth.  
In sum, if efficient transfer of risk is permitted, the supervisory re-
sponsibilities that regulators have long sought to impose on clearing 
firms and sponsors of special purpose vehicles will become enshrined 
in arm’s-length contracts. 
What then would the impact of the proposal be on the range of in-
vestment recommendations financial services providers are likely to 
make?  To the extent that wholesalers are responsible for managing 
much of the risk of rescission, the short answer is likely to be “not 
much.”  Whereas independent investment advisers may well proceed 
with greater caution in offering products (consistent with their exist-
ing fiduciary obligations), wholesalers will continue to rely on retail 
broker-dealers and mortgage originators to push inventory, and as 
discussed above, will likely need to provide some risk-management 
capacity to their correspondents to keep the pipelines open.  
E. Extensibility to Institutional Transactions 
While the Dodd-Frank Act focuses on the fiduciary obligations 
owed to retail investors, the principles that underlie the proposal 
could be used to address the thorny question of suitability and insti-
tutional investors.  One preliminary question that has vexed com-
mentators is whether financial services providers owe any duty, deriv-
ative or otherwise, to investors in a professionally managed fund, such 
as a mutual fund, hedge fund or private equity fund,313 on the theory 
that the directors, general partners, or managing members of such 
funds do not themselves have such advisory duties and may be domi-
nated and controlled, or otherwise have a conflict of interest with the 
financial services provider.  The proposal in this article could handily 
address that issue by simply passing through the same information 
and exercise rights pro rata to individual fund investors.  Because 
many complex securities or derivative transactions already detail dis-
cussions over the pricing of downside protection,314 extending the 
proposed option requirement would largely be superfluous. 
                                                          
 313. Anita K. Krug, Address at the University of Washington School of Law Faculty 
Colloquium:  Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and the Hedge Fund Prob-
lem (Feb. 24, 2011) (on file with author). 
 314. See, e.g., S. Lawrence Polk & Bryan M. Ward, A Guide to the “Regulatory No 
Man’s Land” of Over-the-Counter Interest Rate Swaps, 124 BANKING L.J. 397, 401 (2007) 
(discussing zero cost collars for interest-rate swaps). 
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 As discussed above, one of the principal difficulties that institution-
al investors face is that financial services providers successfully stave 
off liability in private actions under Rule 10b-5 and in suits alleging 
breach of state law fiduciary duty by challenging the justifiability of 
reliance by sophisticated investors.315  Courts, moreover, engage in a 
qualitative, multifactor analysis to determine whether such liability is 
warranted in light of the investor’s sophistication316 and yet treat the 
absence of a right to rely as a complete defense to liability.317  In this 
respect, an affirmative obligation to disclose a single rescission price 
for a transaction or group of transactions, and allowing institutions to 
litigate the accuracy of that price, might pierce through the morass of 
considerations that have clouded liability in such suits without neces-
sarily dramatically increasing the likelihood of liability.   
If a financial services provider’s fiduciary duty required it to reveal 
the price of providing downside protection for a particular transac-
tion (or group of transactions), any subsequent judicial proceedings 
would focus their inquiry on the accuracy of the information at the 
time of the transaction.  In such a system, courts could easily adopt a 
presumption that investors are entitled to rely on the quoted price, 
and that any material misstatement of the price would be deemed to 
be the proximate cause of an investor’s decision not to modify the 
terms of the transaction or seek a contemporaneous hedge against 
downside risk.  As discussed above, however, if a financial services 
provider is able to establish, based on contemporaneous internal 
records, that the price quoted did not materially deviate from the 
price that would have been assigned to a particular transaction by its 
own internal risk management systems, it would be entitled to sum-
mary judgment as a matter of law on any claim alleging breach of fi-
duciary duty. 
To the extent that institutional and other sophisticated investors 
do not engage in isolated transactions, the fiduciary could be permit-
ted to fulfill its duty by offering periodic quotations on a portfolio-
wide basis, rather than quotations in connection with individual 
transactions.  The result would be a continuous stream of informa-
tion from the financial services provider to its clients about the risks 
inherent in their portfolio, based on the firm’s own internal valuation 
                                                          
 315. See supra notes 152–154. 
 316. See supra note 153. 
 317. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1028 
(4th Cir. 1997) (“A plaintiff’s failure to prove that it justifiably relied on a broker's 
alleged omission or misstatement is necessarily fatal to a securities fraud claim.”). 
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models.  Firms, of course, might object that this framework would 
empower clients to “reverse engineer” their proprietary valuation 
models and thus expose firms to the risk of adverse selection when 
entering into transactions with clients; however, any system of fidu-
ciary duties for institutional investors could be designed to curtail this 
risk by periodically tweaking internal controls and negotiating with 
regulators for individualized relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Extending fiduciary duties to retail investment transactions is a 
laudable sentiment that is likely to encounter significant obstacles to 
implementation.  But regulators and industry representatives should 
strive to identify the essence of the goals that proponents of such du-
ties seek to achieve and to find ways to implement the resulting prin-
ciples in a manner that improves not only the quality of recommen-
dations that are made but also the nature of investment conversations 
between firms and their clients across the entire spectrum of financial 
services. 
 
